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. Legal Background
When Gregg v. Georgia2 and companion cases 3 endorsed this country's
return to capital punishment in 1976, the United States Supreme Court accepted
different approaches for guiding the exercise of sentencing discretion.4
Common to these new Gregg-approved post-Furman5 capital statutes was a two
stage, or bifurcated trial at which the guilt and sentencing decisions were to be
made separately and independently.6 Since then, all death penalty jurisdictions
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
4. These have been identified as "balancing" statutes that require the sentencer to weigh
aggravating factors against mitigating factors, "threshold" statutes that require only that the
sentencer find at least one statutory aggravating factor and consider mitigation, and "directed"
statutes under which the sentencer must consider special sentencing issues. These distinctions
among statutes are reviewed in Stephen Giles, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1,26-31,
41-43 (1980) and Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes,
87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1699-1712 (1974). Acker and Lanier provide a detailed discussion of
the forms that these statutes now take. See generally James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, In
Fairness and Mercy: Statutory Mitigating Factors in Capital Punishment Laws, 30 CRIM. L.
BULL. 299 (1994).
5. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (ruling that capital punishment as then
practiced in the United States was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth
Amendment protection against "cruel and unusual" punishment).
6. Concurrent with Gregg, the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976), rejected statutes that made the death penalty mandatory upon conviction of a capital
offense at a unitary trial that decided both guilt and punishment.
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have had a two-phase proceeding in which ajury decides guilt in the first phase
of the trial, and if they find the defendant guilty of capital murder, a second
penalty phase of the trial is held to determine the punishment.
States differed, however, in the sentencing responsibilities they gave judge
and jury at the penalty stage of a capital trial. In 2002, before the Court's
decision in Ring v. Arizona,7 twenty-nine of the thirty-eight death penalty states
gave sentencing authority to the jury; the trial judge had little or no role in
8sentencing. Five states had judge only death penalty statutes that provided for
judicial determinations of the factual foundation and the ultimate sentence
without jury participation in the penalty phase of the trial.9 There were also
four judge override states at that time that provided for a sentencing jury, but
made the jury's sentencing decision advisory and gave the judge final
sentencing authority.' 0
Petitioners initially challenged the constitutionality ofjudge override and
judge only sentencing without success. The Court gave mixed messages in the
pivotal Gregg" and Proffitt 2 cases. In Gregg, the Court noted thatjuries were
a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values with respect to
the imposition of the death penalty,' 3 yet in Proffitt it observed that it has never
suggested that jury sentencing is "constitutionally required."'14  The Court
7. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 (2002).
8. See id. at 608 n.6 (listing state codes that give sentencing authority to juries). The
states using jury sentencing are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
Although the jury's sentencing verdict is presumed to be correct in these twenty-nine
states, the trial judges in California, Kansas, Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia have
statutory authority, under specific circumstances, to invalidate ajury's death penalty verdict and
substitute a life sentence. In none of these states, however, may the trial judge impose a death
sentence when the jury's verdict was life.
9. See id. (listing state codes giving judges the authority to determine the factual
foundation for the sentence and the ultimate sentence). Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska
give the trial judge the authority to decide the sentence and Colorado vests the authority in a
three-judge panel.
10. See id. (listing the state codes for states that used, what the Ring Court called "hybrid
systems," that made the jury's verdict advisory and gave the trial judge the authority to override
the jury recommendation whether it was life or death). Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and
Indiana make the jury's sentencing decision advisory to the judge.
11. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
13. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (seemingly supporting juries as the proper sentencing
authority).
14. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (seemingly lessening its support of juries as the proper
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subsequently held in Spaziano v. Florida that judge override is not per se
unconstitutional, 15 and later, in Harris v. Alabama, that judges need not give
"great weight" to jury sentencing recommendations.' 6 Concerning judge only
sentencing, in Walton v. Arizona, the Court approved judge sentencing without
the participation of a sentencing jury.'7
The tide then turned in Ring. '8 The Supreme Court rejected judge only
sentencing in capital cases. 19 It held that the Sixth Amendment requires that
findings which determine whether a death penalty may be imposed must be
made by a jury.20 The Court explained that when a factual determination makes
a defendant eligible for a more severe sentence it is the functional equivalent of
an element of a greater offense, regardless of what it is called, so the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee applies.2' The Arizona statute was
sentencing authority). The Court went on to say:
[I]t would appear that judicial sentencing would lead, if anything, to even greater
consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial
judge is more experienced at sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.
Id. at 252.
15. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 447 (1984) (upholding Florida's judge override
statute). In holding that the judge's imposition of the death sentence after the jury recommended
life did not violate the right to a trial by jury, the Court differentiated the sentencing phase of a
capital trial from a guilt determination and held that the Sixth Amendment never has been thought
to guarantee a right to a jury determination of the issue of the appropriate punishment to be
imposed on an individual. Id. at 459; see also Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 639 (1989) (per
curiam) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge to Florida's hybrid statute by saying the issue had
been resolved by Spaziano).
16. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,508 (1995) (upholding Alabama's capital statute).
Harris claimed Alabama's capital statute was unconstitutional because it failed to specify the weight
trial judges must give to jury sentencing recommendations. Id. The Court rejected Harris's claim,
holding that requiring "great weight" to be given to jury recommendations would "place within
constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that properly rest within the State's discretion to
administer its criminal justice system." Id. at 512. The Court did, however, acknowledge the
"crucial protection" afforded by the Tedder standard. Id. at 510 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432
U.S. 282, 295 (1977)).
17. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,639 (1990) (upholding Arizona's capital statute).
In Walton, the Court held that the Arizona statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment because
aggravating factors were not "elements of the offense," rather they were "sentencing considerations"
that guided the choice between life and death sentences. Id. at 648.
18. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
19. Id. at 589.
20. Id. at 609 (overruling Walton to the extent it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a
jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty).
21. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a... trial, by an impartial jury... ." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI, § 1. This right has been made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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unconstitutional because it allowed ajudge, rather than a jury, to determine the
existence of factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.22
I. Implications of Ring v. Arizona
In Ring, the Court repudiated the distinction between elements of the
offense and sentencing considerations that it had relied upon in Walton.23 In
Ring, Justice Ginsburg, joined by five other justices,24 indicated that, despite
the importance of stare decisis, the Walton decision was "overrule(d) to the
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. 2 5
The Ring Court explained that the Walton decision could not be reconciled
with its holding in the noncapital case, Apprendi v. New Jersey.26 In Apprendi,
the Court ruled that the existence of racial animus needed for the application of
an enhanced penalty under hate crimes legislation must be found by ajury, not
by a judge. 27  Quoting from Apprendi, the Ring opinion reiterated that it
22. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) ("Because Arizona's enumerated
aggravating factors operate as the 'functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense' the
Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by ajury." (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000))).
23. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 563 (overruling Walton in part).
24. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined the majority opinion.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion; Justice Kennedy also filed
a separate concurrence. Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but not in
the majority's constitutional reasoning. Justice O'Connor filed a dissent in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined.
25. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
26. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The majority opinion in Apprendi
explicitly exempted Walton from its effect by saying that the Arizona statute did not allow a
judge to make findings that raised the maximum sentence, rather it merely allowed a judge to
apply sentencing considerations that determined whether the defendant should get a lesser or
greater sentence after the jury had determined it was a capital offense. Id. at 522-23 (discussing
the decision not to address Walton). In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued, however, that the
judge's finding did increase the maximum penalty because "[a] defendant convicted of first-
degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence unless a judge makes the factual
determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists. Without that critical finding, the
maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death
penalty." Id. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27. The importance of requiring that a jury decide the facts that will determine the
sentence was emphasized a year before Apprendi in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999). In Jones, the Court had to decide whether the federal carjacking statute, which provided
three different maximum penalties, depending on the degree of injury, defined three separate
crimes or a single crime. Id at 229. If it decided the statute defined one crime, then the degrees
of injury would be sentencing factors that determined the appropriate maximum and could be
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violates the Sixth Amendment for a judge to make a determination that
increases a defendant's penalty:
The dispositive question, we said, "is one not of form, but of effect." If a
State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent
on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant may not be
"exposed to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished
according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone."
28
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Ring that Apprendi and Walton
were irreconcilable and overruled Walton.29 The Ring Court made it clear that
it did not matter if the state called them sentencing factors, sentencing
enhancements, or as Justice Scalia says in his concurrence, "Mary Jane;" 30 ifa
finding increases the potential punishment, it is "the functional equivalent of an
element of a greater offense."' 1 The Ring rationale stressed the importance of
the jury in criminal proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that judges
might be less arbitrary than juries in the imposition of the death penalty.32
First, it explained that the Sixth Amendment right does not turn on who would
be the most rational, fair, or efficient fact finder." Noting that the jury trial
guarantee was one of the least controversial portions of the Bill of Rights, the
Court emphasized that the founders of this country did not want to leave
criminal justice decision-making to the State.34 It went on to express doubts
found by the judge. The Court held that the statute must be interpreted as describing three
different crimes to avoid what it called grave constitutional questions. Id. at 240. The Court
restated the principle that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to ajury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 243 n.6.
28. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("All the facts which must exist in order to subject the
defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.").
29. Ring, 556 U.S. at 609 (overruling Walton in part).
30. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n. 19 (2000)). The
Ring Court went on to reject the State's arguments that because "death is different," capital
cases should be handled differently from other criminal cases. Id. at 587. The State had
maintained that even if normally a jury must make any findings that could serve to enhance the
penalty, it should be permissible to allow a judicial determination of aggravating factors
necessary for a death sentence because "death is different." Id. The Court summarily dismissed
this argument by saying there was no apparent reason or precedent for the proposed "death is
different" exception for capital cases. Id.
32. Id. at 607.
33. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607.
34. Id.
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about whether judicial decision-making actually was superior, citing the fact
that the majority of states used juries to sentence capital defendants.35
As Justice O'Connor indicated in her dissent, the Ring decision not only
invalidated the capital sentencing schemes that provided for a judicial
determination of punishment in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and
Nebraska, but it would serve as a basis for challenging the override statutes of
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana where the jury's verdict was advisory
and the judge made the final sentencing decision.36 Indeed, concerns over the
continued viability of override statutes in the wake of Ring led to legislative
reforms in Indiana and Delaware that took effect within a month and a half of
the Ring decision. Effective June 30, 2002, Indiana dropped override by
making the jury recommendation binding on the trial judge.37 For cases
decided after July 22, 2002, Delaware precludes the death penalty unless the
jury finds at least one statutory aggravating factor; but it still allows the judge,
without considering any additional evidence, to determine whether aggravation
outweighs mitigation.38
The Alabama statute still provides for an advisory sentencing verdict after
the punishment phase39 but, as explained in the next subsection, the state
35. Id. at 607-08.
36. Id. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the implication of the Court's
decision to declare the Arizona statute unconstitutional).
37. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West 2004) (noting the amendment by Ind. Pub.
L. No. 117-2002 (effective June 30, 2004) that replaced language that said the judge was not
bound by the jury recommendation with language that says that if the jury reaches a sentencing
recommendation the "court shall sentence the defendant accordingly"). This revision of the
Indiana statute was enacted prior to the June 24, 2002 announcement of the U.S. Supreme
Court's Ring decision, and there is no official legislative history, but "it was widely reported
that the Indiana Legislature was concerned that the forthcoming decision in Ring might
invalidate the Indiana sentencing framework." Indiana v. Barker, No. 49605-9308-CF-095544
(Marion Super. Ct. June 27, 2003) (order dismissing death penalty request) at 2-3 (citing Bill
Nixes Judicial Override on Death Penalty Cases, HAMMOND & MUNSTER TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002,
and High Court Case Could Nullify Death Sentences, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 20, 2002, at
Al) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. See 73 Del. Laws 423 (2002) (amending DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 4209 (2002)). A
judge may not impose a death sentence unless the jury has found at least one aggravating
circumstance listed in the statute unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If the jury
does find one aggravating circumstance, the judge, without considering any additional evidence,
shall impose a death sentence if he or she determines by a preponderance of the evidence that
the aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence. Id.
39. The relevant portions of Alabama statute, Section 13A-5-46, provide:
(a) Unless both parties with the consent of the court waive the right to have the
sentence hearing conducted before a jury ... it shall be conducted before a jury
which shall return an advisory verdict as provided by subsection (e) of this section.
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appellate courts have attempted to provide guidance to the trial courts on how
to implement the statute without running afoul of Ring.40 The Alabama statute
provides that after a penalty trial the jury must return an advisory verdict of life
in prison without parole if it finds that there are no aggravating circumstances.4'
If the jury finds aggravating circumstances but determines that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then subsection (e)(3)
provides that they must recommend death.42 After the jury returns an advisory
verdict, Section 13A-5-47 provides that the judge order a pre-sentence
investigation report and allow the parties for a second time to present
arguments relating to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.4 3
Subsection (e) of 13A-5-47 provides that the court shall determine the sentence
by deciding whether the aggravating circumstances it finds outweigh the
mitigating circumstances. The jury's recommendation is to be given
consideration, but it is not binding.
The Florida statute also permits judges to override the jury's sentencing
recommendations, despite conflicting opinions among the state supreme court
(e) After deliberation, the jury shall return an advisory verdict as follows:
(1) If the jury determines that no aggravating circumstances as defined in
Section 13A-5-49 exist, it shall return an advisory verdict recommending to the
trial court that the penalty be life imprisonment without parole;
(2) If the jury determines that one or more aggravating circumstances as
defined in Section 13A-5-49 exist but do not outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, it shall return an advisory verdict recommending to the trial
court that the penalty be life imprisonment without parole;
(3) If the jury determines that one or more aggravating circumstances as
defined in Section 13A-5-49 exist and that they outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, if any, it shall return an advisory verdict recommending to the
trial court that the penalty be death.
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1994).
40. See infra Part II.C (explaining state courts' treatment ofjudge override statutes in the
wake of Ring).
41. ALA. CODE§ 13A-5-46 (1994).
42. Id.
43. The statute provides:
(d) Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the evidence presented during the
sentence hearing, and the pre-sentence investigation report and any evidence
submitted in connection with it, the trial court shall enter specific written findings
concerning the existence or nonexistence of each aggravating circumstance
enumerated in Section 13A-5-49, each mitigating circumstance enumerated in
Section 13A-5-5 1, and any additional mitigating circumstances offered pursuant to
Section 13A-5-52. The trial court shall also enter written findings of facts
summarizing the crime and the defendant's participation in it.
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(d) (1994).
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justices regarding the implications of Ring.44 Section 921.141(2) provides that
the jury should decide "[w]hether sufficient aggravating circumstances
exist,. . . [w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh
the aggravating circumstances," and, "[b]ased on these considerations, whether
the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death., 45  The
following subsection, 921.141(3), states that "notwithstanding the
recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances shall enter a sentence of life
imprisonment or death., 46 It goes on to require that the judge state his or her
findings of fact in writing if a death sentence is imposed. 47 These findings of
fact must indicate that there were sufficient aggravating circumstances and
insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.
Whenever an Alabama or Florida judge overrides ajury recommendation
for life, then, the judge must be making a determination that contradicts a jury
finding. Either the judge must find aggravating factors that the jury did not
think existed,48 find that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
factors when the jury did not so find, or find that the aggravating factors were
sufficient when the jury reached the opposite conclusion. Because Ring could
be decided simply by requiring that a jury rather than a judge determine the
aggravating circumstances that make the defendant eligible for a death
sentence, the majority opinion did not have to reach the issue of whether ajury
must also decide whether the aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating
evidence or the relative sufficiency findings, without which death cannot be
imposed in Alabama and Florida.49
44. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
45. Florida Statute Section 921.141(2) provides in its entirety:
Advisory sentence by the jury-after hearing all the evidence, the jury shall
deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following
matters: (a) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in
subsection (5); (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which
outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (c) based on these
considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or
death.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West 2002).
46. Id. § 921.141(3).
47. Id.
48. The Alabama statute actually allows the judge to hear evidence relating to the pre-
sentence report which the jury did not consider when reaching its sentencing recommendation.
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1994). Findings based on additional evidence are precisely what the
Court condemned in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592-98 (2002).
49. The majority indicates in footnote 4 that they are not deciding whether the Sixth
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A. Competing Interpretations of Ring
Justice Scalia took the position in his Ring concurrence that the Sixth
Amendment applies only to findings of aggravating facts that must be made by
a jury but not to judgments regarding the relative weight or sufficiency of the
evidence needed to justify a death sentence that may, in his view, be made by a
judge. 50 His argument would appear to validate the recently reformed
Delaware capital statute and the weighing and sufficiency provisions of the
Alabama and Florida statutes. Yet, the logic of Ring suggests that the reach of
the Sixth Amendment's protection in capital sentencing is broader than Justice
Scalia maintains.5' The Court's emphasis on effect over form discounts the
relevance of substantive differences between findings of fact and findings of
weight or sufficiency. Although findings that aggravation exists are
prerequisite to judgments of its weight or sufficiency relative to mitigation, they
are no more essential than the mandated value judgments to the life or death
sentencing decision. Without findings of each kind the death penalty cannot be
imposed under the Alabama and Florida statutes. The rationale of Ring would
seem, therefore, to require that jurors decide the relative weight or sufficiency
of aggravating and mitigating factors. 2
Amendment requires "the jury to make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death
penalty," as the defendant does not make that claim. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4.
50. Id. at 610-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
5 1. Bryan Stevenson observes that the Court's assertions of similarity between hybrid and
judge-only statutes, in its rulings leading up to Ring indicate that hybrid statutes are no longer
constitutional. See Bryan A. Stevenson, Two Views on the Impact of Ring v. Arizona on
Capital Sentencing: The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment: The Requisite Role
of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1106-10 (2003) (discussing the five
death penalty decisions which "shaped the modem era of capital punishment jurisprudence").
He explains that the rationale requiring that a jury find the aggravating circumstance that
qualifies a defendant for the death penalty would also necessitate that ajury determine the "two
other components of the tripartite sentencing determination:" Findings regarding the existence
of mitigating factors and a determination of the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating
factors. Id. at 1126. Just as a death sentence may not be imposed without findings of
aggravation, it cannot be imposed unless there is a determination regarding mitigation, and a
determination that aggravation outweighs mitigation. Id. at 1129.
In a companion law review article, Nathan Forrester takes the opposing view that a jury
need only find an aggravating circumstance to qualify the defendant for the death penalty, and
then the judge can make the ultimate determination of whether the defendant deserves that
punishment. See generally Nathan A. Forrester, Two Views on the Impact of Ring v. Arizona on
Capital Sentencing: Judge Versus Jury: The Continuing Validity of Alabama's Capital
Sentencing Regime after Ring v. Arizona, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1157 (2003).
52. It seems especially important to have jurors decide the relative weight or sufficiency
of aggravating and mitigating factors because this decision involves making value judgments.
See infra note 89 and accompanying text. Also see Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Ring,
940
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Courts in the states with override statutes have taken various approaches to
Ring, but all to the same effect: Each has affirmed its hybrid statute. The
Supreme Court of Alabama held, in Ex parte Waldrop," that Ring was not
violated because at least one aggravating factor, committing a capital offense
during a robbery, was implicit in the jury's verdicts of guilt on the murder and
robbery charges.54 The Alabama court seems to have taken the approach
suggested by Justice Scalia, as it went on to hold that "whether the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances is not a finding of fact
or an element of the offense." 55 A subsequent case, Ex parte McNabb,56
involved a death sentence that depended on an aggravating circumstance that
was not implicit in the conviction of guilt.57 In McNabb, the jury recommended
death, and the Alabama Supreme Court held that they must have found an
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before making a death
recommendation, because the trial judge had instructed them that a finding of
aggravation was a prerequisite for recommending death.58 In Ex parte
McGriff,59 the Alabama Supreme Court cites Waldrop and McNabb with
approval, and explains that the McGriff case is similar to McNabb because a
conviction of guilt in both these latter cases did not include the aggravating
circumstance alleged. 60 The McGriffjury also had recommended death, but the
case was remanded on other grounds, and the court was concerned that there
might be a problem meeting the Ring requirements if the subsequent jury
recommended life.6' The Alabama Supreme Court instructed that at the retrial
the lower court should avoid using the words "advisory" and "recommendation"
when referring to findings of aggravation and include specific questions on the
verdict form that would record the jurors' votes on the finding of aggravation.62
This would make it clear whether the requisite finding of aggravation had been
made by the jury and allow the judge to override the jury regardless of whether
they recommended life or death.
536 U.S. at 580, discussed infra in notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
53. Exparte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2003).
54. Id. at 1188.
55. Id. at 1190.
56. Exparte McNabb, 887 So. 2d 998 (Ala. 2004).
57. See id. at 999 (providing a brief discussion of the defendant's crime).
58. See id. at 1044 (finding the jury instructions were not in plain error).
59. Exparte McGriff, 908 So. 2d 1024 (Ala. 2004).
60. See id. at 1037-38 (discussing the circumstance of McNabb and Waldrop).
61. See id. at 1034-39 (discussing the failure of the trial judge to provide a heat of
passion instruction and providing instructions on remand).
62. See id. at 1038 (providing instructions for remand).
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Delaware also concluded that Ring does not require the jury to do the
weighing, because only one aggravating circumstance is needed to make the
defendant death eligible. 63  According to its analysis, the weighing of
aggravators against mitigators does not increase the potential punishment,
rather it "ensures that the punishment imposed is appropriate and
proportional. "64
The Florida Supreme Court did not have to decide if Ring required a jury
determination of whether the sufficiency of the aggravators compared to the
mitigators warranted death because of the way they upheld their statute in
Bottoson v. Moore.65 In denying Bottoson relief under Ring, they noted that the
U.S. Supreme Court had summarily denied Bottoson's petition for certiorari
and lifted his stay of execution four days after deciding Ring and without
mentioning Ring or instructing the Florida Court to reconsider Bottoson in light
of Ring.66 The Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the U.S. Supreme
Court had repeatedly upheld its capital statute in the past,67 and cited U.S.
63. See Brice v. Delaware, 815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del. 2003) ("Once the jury determines that a
statutory aggravating factor exists, the defendant becomes death eligible."); see also Ortiz v. Delaware,
869 A.2d 285,305 (Del. 2005) (relying on Brice to reject the defendant's claim that his death sentence
was unconstitutional under Ring because it was based, at least in part, on judicial findings of non-
statutory aggravators).
64. Oritz, 869 A.2d at 305 (quoting Brice, 815 A.2d at 322).
65. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002) (denying the defendant's petition
because the Supreme Court did not direct the State Supreme Court to reconsider the defendant's case
after Ring).
66. Id. at 695. Several of thejustices in the Bottoson case noted thatthe U.S. Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari may not indicate approval of Florida's statute. Id at 699 (Quince, J., concurring).
Justice Shaw in his concurrence suggested that certiorari may have been denied because in the federal
courts a new rule of law will not be applied in post conviction appeals. Id. at 711 (Shaw, J.,
concurring) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). ChiefJustice Anstead stated, "Whether this
denial [of certiorari] was based on a procedural bar, a lack of retroactive effect; or some other reason, is
impossible to know." Id. at 704 n. 17 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
In Brice, the Delaware Supreme Court included the following footnote in its discussion of the
meaning of the denial of certiorari in the Bottoson case:
Of course, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned against drawing broad
conclusions from a denial of certiorari. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) ("[Tlhe denial of a petition for writ of
certiorari is not a ruling on the merits. Sometimes such an order reflects nothing more
than a conclusion that a particular case may not constitute an appropriate forum in which
to decide a significant issue."); see also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) ("Often a
denial of certiorari on a novel issue will permit the state and federal courts to 'serve as
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this
Court."') (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983)).
Brice, 815 A.2d at 319 n.3.
67. See Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 695 n.4 (referencing four major cases in which the U.S.
Supreme Court had upheld the Florida capital statute).
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Supreme Court case law holding that state courts should follow precedents
that directly control even if they seem to conflict with subsequent rulings that
arise in different contexts.68 Because Ring did not directly rule on the Florida
statute and previous cases had found it constitutional, the per curiam opinion
refrained from holding the statute unconstitutional. However, the
concurrences of Justices Shaw and Pariente indicated that they thought
Florida's approach was problematic after Ring, and were upholding
Bottoson's death sentence because he had a prior violent felony conviction
that was exempt from the Ring requirement because it resulted from a prior
69case where the defendant had the right to a jury determination. Chief
Justice Anstead and Justice Pariente emphasized that the Florida and Arizona
statutes were essentially the same, and the former quoted U.S. Supreme Court
language to that effect from the Walton decision. 70 It is not necessary to
discuss all the different arguments presented in Bottoson, but the lack of
accord on the impact of Ring is reflected in the seven separate opinions
written by the state supreme court justices in this per curiam decision.
Despite the conflicting opinions of the Florida Supreme Court justices, they
have relied on Bottoson to repeatedly reject Ring-based challenges to their
statute.7"
The state supreme court in Indiana rejected Ring challenges to death
sentences in two cases because jury findings of the requisite aggravating
68. Id. at 695 ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the other courts should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
(citing Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
69. See id. at 718-19 (Shaw, J., concurring) (providing a different reading ofRing); id. at
722-23 (Pariente, J., concurring) (providing a recommendation for administering Florida's
death statute in light of Ring).
70. Chief Justice Anstead relies on the following quote from Walton:
The distinctions Walton attempts to draw between the Florida and Arizona
statutory schemes are not persuasive. It is true that in Florida the jury recommends
a sentence, but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to the
existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not
binding on the trial judge. A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a
jury's findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in
Arizona.
Id. at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).
Judge Pariente also focuses on the similarity between the Florida and Arizona statutes. Id. at
720-21 (Pariente, J., concurring).
71. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 903 So. 2d 888, 900 (Fla. 2005) (relying on Bottoson to
reject a challenge to Florida's death penalty scheme); Hernando-Albertez v. State, 889 So. 2d
721, 733 (Fla. 2004).
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circumstance were implicit in the jury's recommendations72 and the Indiana
Supreme Court made clear in Ritchie v. Indiana73 that it also was adopting the
view that the judge can weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstance once
there has been a jury finding of aggravation. In the Ritchie case, the court
expressly rejects the argument that the jury must weigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, 74 and cites cases in other jurisdictions reaching
similar conclusions.
7 5
Although Nevada does not have a hybrid statute, its supreme court had to
deal with a Ring challenge in Johnson v. State76 because the state statute
allowed a three-judge panel to decide the sentence when the jury could not
reach a unanimous decision in a capital case.77 The court held that the Nevada
statute violated Ring because it "requires two distinct findings to render a
defendant death-eligible: 'The jury or the panel of judges may impose a
sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and
further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.' 78 Although the court
recognized that Ring had not explicitly reached this issue, it determined that
Ring still required a jury to make both determinations because a defendant
could not receive the death penalty without the second finding pertaining to
mitigation.79 The Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that the weighing process in
its statute "is necessary to authorize the death penalty in Nevada, and [it
concluded] that it is in part a factual determination, not merely discretionary
weighing. 
0
72. See Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ind. 2003) (finding no violation of
Ring); Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1161 (Ind. 2003) (holding that Ring does not
require specific jury forms).
73. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004).
74. Id. at 266-67 (noting that other states with similar sentencing schemes have reached
the same conclusion).
75. See also State v. Ben-Yisrayl, 809 N.E.2d 309, 311 (Ind. 2004) (reversing a lower
court judge's determination that required the jury to decide the weighing element as the finding
that aggravation outweighed mitigation also was required before a death penalty could be
imposed); State v. Barker, 809 N.E.2d 312, 314-15 (Ind. 2004) (same); State v. Charles Barker,
Order Dismissing Death Penalty Request, 49GO5-9308-CF-095544, at 11. In accord, State v.
Ben-Yisrayl, Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Death Penalty Request, CR84-076E.
76. Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev. 2002).
77. Id. at 458-62 (applying Ring to the Nevada Statute).
78. Id. at 460 (quoting NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.554(3) (West 2001)).
79. Id. (noting that the finding regarding mitigating circumstances is necessary to
authorize the death penalty in Nevada).
80. Id. at 460.
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When the Supreme Court overruled Walton in the Ring decision, it
abandoned the distinction between elements of the offense and sentencing
factors that it had previously used to uphold hybrid statutes in Proffitt,
8'
Spaziano,82 Hildwin,83 and Harris.84 The logic used in Ring as a justification
for overruling Walton casts doubt on the constitutionality of hybrid statutes,85
but Ring did not make any definitive pronouncements regarding the status of
hybrid statutes because its holding was limited to findings of aggravation under
Arizona's judicial sentencing scheme. As the Court points out, Ring's claim
was "tightly delineated" and did not include the issues of whether a jury must
find mitigating circumstances or assess the relative weight of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to "make the ultimate determination whether to
impose the death penalty.0
6
Arguably, judge override statutes are even more problematic than the
judge only statutes invalidated by Ring. When judges override jury
recommendations based on the sufficiency or relative weight of evidence they
are enhancing the penalty by actually contradicting what the jury found, not
merely by making additional findings. Furthermore, these determinations
involve value judgments that seem especially appropriate for the jury
considering the concerns underlying the Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial.
Kalven and Zeisel's seminal research on jury decision-making found that it was
precisely with respect to values that judge and jury are most apt to differ.8 7
Ring's emphasis on the importance of a jury determination raises another
crucial question in the hybrid context: Does giving the judge authority over the
jury in making the punishment decision compromise the jury's sense of
responsibility or scrupulousness in their decision-making?
When deciding whetherjudicial override is constitutional after Ring, many
aspects of these hybrid systems must be considered. A fundamental question is
whether it is sufficient if ajury has found at least one aggravating factor; and if
81. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 428 (1976).
82. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
83. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989).
84. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995).
85. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 538 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing how Ring casts doubt on the constitutionality of hybrid statutes).
86. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 n.4 (2002).
87. See HARRY KALvEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 494-95 (1966)
(discussing how roughly two out of three of the criminal cases where judges indicated that they
would have decided differently than the jury were "marked by some jury response to values").
In the thirty-five cases they studied in which either the judge or the jury would impose death,
the judge and jury only agreed in fourteen cases, while they disagreed about the penalty in
twenty-one cases. Id. at 436.
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it matters if the aggravating factor is a prior conviction, a contemporaneous
crime included in the guilt conviction, or a part of the jury recommendation at
sentencing. A second key question is whether the jury should decide the
relative weight or the sufficiency of aggravating and mitigating factors
considering these determinations are essential before death can be imposed.
Thirdly, it must be determined whether the constitutionality of a judicial
sentence of death turns on whether the jury recommendation was life or death.
The quality ofjury decision-making under hybrid statutes should be taken into
account when answering these questions. If giving the judge authority over the
jury in making the punishment decision compromises the jury's sense of
responsibility or scrupulousness in their decision-making, it seems inadvisable
to preserve any vestiges of these hybrid systems.
B. Juries as Conscience of the Community
In Ring, Justice Breyer concurred with the Court's invalidation of
Arizona's judge only sentencing scheme but not with its constitutional
reasoning.88 He relied instead upon the Eighth Amendment's emphasis on the
jury's role as the "conscience of the community," for the argument that the jury
alone must make the ultimate life or death sentencing decision, and hence both
the fact finding and evaluative judgments inherent in that decision.89 Jury
sentencing is essential, he observed, because the main justification for capital
punishment is retribution, and juries are better able than judges to decide when
that purpose is served.90 Because juries more accurately represent the
composition and experience of the community at large, they better reflect
community sentiments about what penalty is deserved in a particular case.
Justice Breyer cites language from prior cases in support of his argument:
88. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 613-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. See id. at 616 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that jurors have an important
comparative advantage over judges in respect to retribution).
90. Justice Breyer writes, "I am convinced by the reasons that Justice Stevens has given.
These include (1) his belief that retribution provides the main justification for capital
punishment, and (2) his assessment of the jury's comparative advantage in determining, in a
particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that end." Id. at 614 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). He argues, again, following Justice Stevens, that the death penalty cannot be
justified on the grounds of deterrence or incapacitation. Id. at 614-15 (Breyer, J., concurring).
He observes that studies of deterrence are at most inconclusive, and that research on
incapacitation shows that offenders sentenced to life without parole rather than the death penalty
rarely commit additional crimes. Id.
946
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In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important comparative advantage
over judges. In principle, they are more attuned to "the community's moral
sensibility," because they "reflect more accurately the composition and
experiences of the community as a whole." Hence they are more likely to
"express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life
or death," and better able to determine in the particular case the need for
retribution, namely, "an expression of the community's belief that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only
adequate response may be the penalty of death."
9 1
Breyer sees jury sentencing in capital cases as one of the special procedural
safeguards required by Gregg, without which Furman forbids capital
punishment.
92
Further reason for needing the jury as a barometer of community
sentiments, according to Justice Breyer, is the "continued division of opinion"
on capital punishment. 93 He points out that many believe the death penalty is
fundamentally cruel and unusual because it is irreversible and sometimes
wrongly imposed, its application is influenced by race and socioeconomic
factors, it often involves intolerably long delays, and defendants often receive
inadequate representation.94 He notes that the United States is the only Western
industrialized nation that still uses the death penalty, but more than two-thirds
of American counties have not imposed the death penalty since the Gregg
decision in 1976.95 For these reasons, he argues, "the danger of unwarranted
imposition of the penalty cannot be avoided unless 'the decision to impose the
91. Id. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). In support of this
argument, Breyer cites research showing that judges who override jury life verdicts are
especially prone to making serious errors. J. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II:
WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 405-
06 (2002) (hereinafter A BROKEN SYSTEM), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/
press/reports/a broken system.part-ii.html.
92. Justice Breyer states:
This Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires States to apply special
procedural safeguards when they seek the death penalty. Otherwise, the
constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" would forbid its
use. Justice Stevens has written that those safeguards include a requirement that a
jury impose any sentence of death. Although I joined the majority in Harris v.
Alabama, I have come to agree with the dissenting view, and with the related views
of others upon which it in part relies.
Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
93. Id. at 616 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the views of those opposing the
death penalty).
95. Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 91, at App. B
tbl. 11A).
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death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single governmental
official.' 9 6 He concludes that "the Eighth Amendment requires individual
jurors to make, and to take responsibility for, a decision to sentence a person to
death."97
C. Juries as Responsible for the Defendant's Punishment
Beyond the holding of Ring and the arguments set forth by Justice Breyer,
there is the further critical issue of the jury's acceptance of responsibility, as
mandated by Caldwell v. Mississippi,98 when the judge may override their
decision. In Caldwell, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned:
A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very
unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and
uncomfortable choice.... Given such a situation, the uncorrected
suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death
will rest with others presents an intolerable danger that the jury will in fact
choose to minimize the importance of its role.
Professor Michael Mello has argued that, by their nature, statutes that
permit judges to override the jury's sentence lead jurors to eschew
responsibility for their sentencing decision, and that override statutes thus
constitute a built-in structural violation of Caldwell.1°° That is, unlike
individual prosecutors who may, in some instances, lead jurors to deny
responsibility, jury override does so across the board in all cases that reach the
penalty phase of a capital trial. Mello aptly characterizes this situation:
At some point in the sentencing proceeding.., the jury is ... told that the
ultimate sentencing responsibility rests not upon itself, but with the trial
judge. The judge will make the final determination; they are only to issue a
"recommendation" or "advisory" sentence.... The message is clear: Your
job is not to decide whether the defendant will live or die; you are here only
to provide your advice, your opinion, and the court is not bound by your
recommendation.... The jury is left, at best, with the sense that its
96. Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
97. Id. at 619 (Breyer, J., concurring).
98. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
99. Id. at 333.
100. See Michael A. Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The
Unconstitutionality of Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge
and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REv. 283, 303 (1989) (examining the "constitutionality of capital
sentencing schemes that divide sentencing responsibility between judge and juries").
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sentencing decision will not necessarily be followed. At worst, it may
believe that its determination is only pro forma, of little relevance to the
defendant's fate. Faced with its diminished sentencing role, this jury is
prone toward the same death-bias against which the Court warned in
Caldwell. 10 1
In Bottoson, where the Florida Supreme Court evaluated the impact of
Ring on its statute, Justice Lewis's concurrence also expresses concerns about
the validity of Florida's approach in light of Caldwell in conjunction with
Ring.102 He notes that although the Florida Supreme Court had previously
rejected a Caldwell challenge to its jury instructions, the jury instructions may
be invalid after Ring because they tell the jury that its sentence is merely a
recommendation.10 3 Justice Lewis explains that:
[C]learly, under Ring, the jury plays a vital role in the determination of a
capital defendant's sentence through the determination of aggravating
factors. However, under Florida's standard penalty phase jury instructions,
the role of the jury is minimized, rather than emphasized, as is the
necessary implication to be drawn from Ring.14
This issue concerning the impact of override on the jury's willingness to
assume full responsibility for the punishment of the convicted capital defendant
is a fundamentally empirical question. The more specific questions it asks are:
Does the fact that a jury may have its decision reversed by the trial judge
diminish the sense of responsibility or how seriously jurors take their duties?
Does it make them more careless about understanding or following their
sentencing instructions? Does it make them less scrupulous about their
decision-making, impatient to be done with the decision?
Mello marshaled indirect evidence from social psychological studies and
mock jury research to address some of these questions. 105 Doubtless most of
the research he assembled could be subjected to the same complaints leveled
against studies submitted by the defense in Lockhart v. McCree10 6 namely, that
the findings are suspect because the subjects were not real jurors who made the
101. Id.
102. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 731-34 (2002) (Lewis, J., concurring).
103. See id. at 731 (Lewis, J., concurring) (explaining how Florida's standard penalty
phase jury instructions may no longer be valid). But see Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853, 854
(Fla. 1988) (rejecting the petitioner's argument that the standard jury instruction was
unconstitutional); Cook v. State, 792 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 2001) (same).
104. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 733 (Lewis, J., concurring).
105. See Mello, supra note 100, at 315-32 (discussing the jury's willingness to discuss
responses).
106. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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actual sentencing decision in real capital cases. 0 7 We obviate this objection
here with data from interviews conducted by the Capital Jury Project (CJP)
with real jurors in real capital cases who made the life or death sentencing
decision in judge override and jury binding states. Notably, findings from the
CJP interviews with capital jurors were recently cited in Schriro v.
Summerlin'0 8 with respect to whether the decision of judges or juries are a
more reliable reflection of community values, a concern of Justice Breyer in
Ring. The question we address here is not whether judge or jury is more
reliable or appropriate as sentencer, but whether jurors are better sentencers
when their decisions are final and binding on the trial judge or when their
decisions are simply recommendations that may or may not be followed by the
trial judge.
The findings of the Capital Jury Project presented here make clear the
danger of allowing the override statutes to stand. The Sixth and Eighth
Amendment arguments enunciated in Ring and the importance of jury's
recognizing their responsibility emphasized in Caldwell all suggest that the
hybrid systems are fatally flawed. Findings revealing that jurors in states with
hybrid systems are more likely to deny responsibility, invest less energy in
understanding instructions, and more often rush to judgment demonstrate how
the potential for judicial override eviscerates Sixth and Eighth Amendment
protections and warrants the concerns raised in Caldwell.
I1. The Capital Jury Project
The Capital Jury Project is a national program of research on the decision-
making of capital jurors conducted by a consortium of university-based
researchers with the support of the National Science Foundation.' 0 9 The
findings of the CJP are based on in-depth interviews with persons who have
107. One study cited by Mello did involve interviews with jurors who sat in actual capital
sentencing hearings in Florida. See Mello, supra note 100, at 318 n. 149 (citing William Geimer
& Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida
Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1988)).
108. Schriro v. Sunmerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004) (citing articles based on the CJP).
109. The CJP was undertaken by university-based investigators specializing in the analysis
of data collected in their respective states and collaborating to address the following objectives
of the Project: (1) To examine and systematically describe jurors' exercise of capital sentencing
discretion; (2) to identify the sources and assess the extent of arbitrariness in jurors' exercise of
capital discretion; and (3) to assess the efficacy of the principal forms of capital statutes in
controlling arbitrariness in capital sentencing. This research was supported by the Law and
Social Sciences Program of the National Science Foundation, grant NSF SES-9013252; Dr.
William J. Bowers, Principal Investigator.
950
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served as jurors on capital trials in fourteen states. The interviews chronicle the
jurors' experiences and decision-making over the course of the trial, identify
points at which various influences come into play, and reveal the ways in which
jurors reach their final sentencing decisions.' 10 Fourteen states were chosen to
represent the principal variations in capital sentencing statutes, including the
distinction between hybrid and binding schemes."' Juror interviews were
conducted in Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia.
Within the respective states, the researchers selected samples of fifteen to
thirty capital trials, 1 2 representing both death and life sentencing outcomes."13
110. The research is based on a common core of data collected in the participating states.
The investigators cooperatively developed a core juror interview instrument for use in all states
and enhanced the usefulness of this instrument in their respective states by adding to the
information gathered in the core interviews in their states, by conducting additional interviews
in selected cases of special interest, and by incorporating additional case-specific data from
other sources. The juror interviews obtained data on some 700 variables through structured
questions used in all states, and included open-ended questions that called for detailed narrative
accounts of the respondents' experiences as capital jurors. Neutrally worded questions were
read verbatim to avoid influencing jurors' responses. Advanced law and social science students
working under the supervision of the various faculty investigators carried out much of the
interviewing and other data collection in the respective states. All jurors selected for interviews
were guaranteed confidentiality. The preparation of the interview data for state-level and
project-wide statistical analyses was carried out at the College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern
University under the direction of William J. Bowers. For further information on the research
design and methodology, see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design,
and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1077-85 (1995).
111. The sample was designed to include (1) states with "threshold," "balancing," and
"directed" statutory guidelines for the exercise of sentencing discretion, (2) states with
"traditional" and "narrowing" statutory definitions of capital murder, and (3) states that make the
jury sentencing decision binding and those that permit the judge to override the jury's decision.
For further details about sampling states, see id. at 1077-79.
112. The sample of trials was restricted to those in which the defendant was charged with a
murder punishable by death, convicted of that murder in the guilt phase of the trial, and
sentenced to life or death by ajury in the sentencing phase of the trial. The sampling plan for
each state called for an equal representation of trials that ended in life and death sentencing
decisions to maximize the potential for comparing and contrasting jurors in "life" and "death"
cases within each state. Hence, trials were not sampled to be strictly representative within states
or within the nation as a whole, but to facilitate analytic comparisons. See id. at 1079-89
(providing further details about sampling trials within states).
113. Although the death penalty alternative was a "life sentence" in most states, states
differed in the mandatory minimum sentence served before parole eligibility. Alabama,
California, Missouri, and Pennsylvania had life without the possibility of parole as the only
death penalty alternative. The mandatory minimum for parole eligibility in these states is shown
in William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration
of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REv. 605 tbl. 1 (1999).
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From each trial, a target sample of four jurors was systematically selected for
in-depth, three to four hour personal interviews. 14 The questioning probed
for jurors' assumptions, reasoning, and deliberations when deciding the
punishment, how and when they made their decision, what factors they
considered, and their understanding of the jury's sentencing instructions. Most
interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.
A total of 1198 interviews with jurors from 353 capital trials in fourteen
states have been conducted." 5  These fourteen states are responsible for
76.12% of the persons on death row as of January 1, 2005, and for 78.19% of
the 972 persons who were executed between 1977 and June 8, 2005.116 Some
forty articles presenting and discussing the findings of the CJP have been
published in scholarly journals.' '1
IV Jurors Under Hybrid and Binding Capital Statutes
We now examine the punishment decision-making of jurors under
hybrid and binding capital statutes. In particular we investigate the
impact of hybrid statutes on jurors' willingness to assume responsibility
for the sentencing decision, on the care they take to understand
114. Investigators could conduct additional interviews in cases where the initial interviews
raised questions that further interviews might help to resolve. In two states (Kentucky and
Virginia), samples of more than fourjurors were drawn from cases where the minimum sample
of trials with life or death outcomes could not be met within the initial time frame for data
collection. The target sample of four jurors per case was not always met due to difficulties in
applying the sampling and replacement protocol, locating jurors whose addresses and phone
numbers had changed or were not initially correct or sufficiently detailed, and the unwillingness
of some jurors to be interviewed, despite the $20 incentive payment. Of the 353 trials in the
sample, 39 trials are represented by a single juror, 45 by 2, 71 by 3, 152 by 4, 31 by 5, 13 by 6,
and 1 each by 7 and 8 jurors.
115. The number of jurors interviewed and the number of trials from which they were
drawn in each state are as follows: Alabama, 59 jurors, 20 trials; California, 152 jurors, 36
trials; Florida, 117 jurors, 30 trials; Georgia, 77 jurors, 25 trials; Indiana, 102 jurors, 32 trials;
Kentucky, 113 jurors, 31 trials; Louisiana, 30 jurors, 10 trials; Missouri, 61 jurors, 19 trials;
North Carolina, 83 jurors, 26 trials; Pennsylvania, 74 jurors, 28 trials; South Carolina, 114
jurors, 31 trials; Tennessee, 49 jurors, 15 trials; Texas, 120 jurors, 38 trials; and Virginia, 47
jurors, 12 trials.
116. See Death Row Inmates by State, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
scid=98&did=188#state (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); Executions by State, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=88&did=1 86#state (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
117. A complete list of publications reporting CJP findings can be found at
http://www.cjp.neu.edu, which is periodically updated and includes the full text of some articles.
The most detailed discussion of the research methodology can be found in Bowers, supra note
110, at 1077-79.
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sentencing instructions, and on the conscientiousness with which they
make the sentencing decision. The findings are based on two kinds of
data from the CJP interviews with capital jurors: (1) Jurors' responses to
structured questions with predetermined response options that probed
their thinking and decision-making during the trial, and (2) jurors'
narrative accounts of their decision-making in response to open ended
questions that encouraged them to describe the decision-making process
in their own words.
In each area of inquiry, we first present jurors' responses to structured
questions and then their narrative accounts. The analysis of responses to
structured questions compares jurors from Alabama, Florida, and Indiana,
where the trial judge was able to override the jury's sentence, with jurors
from the eleven other states, where their sentencing decisions were binding.
Jurors' responses are shown separately for the respective states." 8 Juror
responses are grouped into hybrid and binding categories and the
differences between the hybrid and binding states are tested for statistical
significance."19 The state-by-state tabulation ofjurors' responses makes it
possible to see how consistently the hybrid-binding difference distinguishes
not merely the group of hybrid states from the group of binding states but
each of the hybrid states from any and all of the binding states. 20 In
addition to this statistical evidence, we draw upon the interviews with
118. The tables do not show percentages for Louisiana separately because the sampling
goals were not met for that state and hence the state specific statistics are less reliable. The
twenty-nine interviews conducted with Louisiana capital jurors are, however, included in the
summary statistics for the jury binding states as a group.
119. For each of the differences between the group ofjurors in the three hybrid states and
the group in the eleven binding states in Tables 1-3, we test for the probability that the observed
difference would occur by chance. Given that the sampling ofjurors was clustered by trial, the
traditional Chi Square test of statistical independence is not appropriate. However, the STATA
8.0 software package allows us to calculate an F statistic with an adjustment for the clustering of
jurors by trial. Thep value associated with this F statistic can be interpreted in the same way as
the p value for the Chi Square statistic. See STATACORP., STATA STATISTICAL SOFTwARE:
RELEASE 8.0., STATA SURVEY DATA: REFERENCE MANUAL RELEASE 8.0 at 73 (2003).
The p value for the F test indicates the probability that the observed difference between
jurors in the three hybrid and the eleven binding states would occur by chance. The scientific
convention is to consider a difference as statistically significant (not a result of chance variation)
if the probability (p value) is less than .05; that is, such a difference would occur by chance in
less than five of one hundred samples of the same size.
120. Because we sampled roughly equal numbers of life and death cases in each state, the
percentage differences between states in the variables under consideration will tend to be
independent of, and hence not confounded by, factors that produce differences in the likelihood
of a death sentence among states. For this reason, of course, the state specific percentages are
not strictly representative state level estimates of the variables in question.
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jurors from the hybrid states for verbatim accounts of their thinking and
behavior that help to elucidate and explain the statistical findings. We
confirm the robustness of the findings in Appendix A.
A. Taking Responsibility for the Defendant's Punishment
The jurors in hybrid states were especially unlikely to see themselves
as responsible for the defendant's punishment. Nearly all jurors in the
three hybrid states understood that the judge did not have to accept their
punishment decision. In light of this recognition, they were far less likely
than those in the binding states to say the jury was strictly responsible for
whether the defendant lived or died. 12' Under hybrid as compared to
binding statutes, jurors saw the jury as less responsible than the judge
and themselves individually as less responsible than the jury collectively
for the defendant's punishment. The jurors in hybrid states were also less
likely than those in the binding states to "feel bad" about the possibility
of having their sentence rejected by the trial judge either because it made
their sentencing decision less important or because the defendant might
not get the punishment he deserved.
1. Statistical Data
The responsibility-related findings presented in Table 1 are based on
three sets of questions. The first two questions asked whether jurors
believed that the judge must accept the jury's sentencing decision 122 and
121. The Court in Caldwell stressed that capital jurors must see themselves as the ones
responsible for the defendant's punishment. The Court stated that "[tihe uncorrected suggestion
that the responsibility for any ultimate determination of death will rest with others presents an
intolerable danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance of its role."
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985). The Court also noted that "it is
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer
who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere." Id. at 328-29.
122. The exact wording of the first of these two questions was:
How likely did you think it was that a jury decision for the death penalty would be accepted or
rejected by the trial judge?
the judge must accept the jury's decision; it's final
the judge would probably accept the jury's decision
the judge would probably reject the jury's decision
had no idea what the judge would do
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whether they felt that the defendant's punishment was strictly the jury's
responsibility.1 23 The second set of questions asked jurors to rank five
agents or sources in terms of responsibility for the defendant's
punishment.124 The remaining two questions probed whether jurors felt
bad about the possibility that their sentencing decision might be
overridden by the judge.1
25
The percent affirming the first response option appears in column I of Table 1.
123. The exact wording of this question was:
When you were considering the punishment, did you think that whether [defendant's name]
lived or died was
strictly the jury's responsibility and no one else's?
mostly the jury's responsibility, but the judge or appeals courts take over
responsibility whenever they overrule or change the jury's decision?
partly the jury's responsibility and partly the responsibility of the judge and appeals
courts who review the jury's sentence in all cases?
mostly the responsibility of the judge and appeals courts; we make the first decision
but they make the final decision?
The percent affirming the first of these response options appears in column 2 of Table 1.
124. The question read:
Rank the following from "most" through "least" responsible for [defendant's name] punishment.
(Give one for most through five for least responsible.)
the law that states what punishment applies
the judge who imposes the sentence
the jury that votes for the sentence
the individual juror since the jury's decision depends on the vote of each juror
[Defendant's name] because his/her conduct is what actually determined the
punishment
Two variables were formed from three of the responses to this five part question, one indicating
that the judge was ranked as more responsible than the jury, and the other indicating that the
jury was ranked as more responsible than the individual juror. They appear respectively in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.
125. The exact wording of the questions on how the jurors felt about the possibility of a
judicial override was:
Did the chances that your punishment decision might be overruled or changed make you feel ...
bad, because it makes our sentencing decision less important?
bad, because it means that [defendant's name] might not get what s/he deserves?
Jurors had the option of answering "yes," "no," or "not sure" to each of these queries. The
percent giving an affirmative response to each appears respectively in columns 5 and 6 of
Table 1.
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Table 1: Percent of Jurors Responding to Various Indicators of Responsibility for the
Defendant's Punishment in Hybrid and Binding States
Felt Bad Because of
Possible Override
Judge Seterice is JwyMcre Juot More Disin Not Get
Must StrictlyJuy's Respcmis'ble Respm-ble Made Less Dmrmd
Acept Responsibility Tha Judge Than Juy Inpott Ptirt
Juy
S e _ _ _ _
HYBRID STATES:
AL 0.0 9.8 45.8- 26.1 19.1 21.7
FL 4.3 6.0 63.2 27.0 23.1 27.4
IN 8.3 6.4 51.6 32.3 18.8 24.2
All 4.9 6.9 55.6 28.8 20.8 25.2
Hybrid I I I
BINDING STATES:
CA 39.6 41.4 84.2 36.5 34.3 34.4
GA 57.3 53.4 87.7 41.2 28.1 45.5
KY 24.1 20.4 70.8 33.3 33.0 50.5
MO 44.3 33.3 90.0 28.8 34.5 35.7
NC 56.6 35.4 80.3 34.7 29.7 32.9
PA 47.3 42.9 86.8 36.4 33.3 33.8
SC 48.2 22.3 82.9 52.7 32.5 38.1
TN 53.2 25.5 85.1 43.5 31.1 40.0
TX 51.7 33.9 83.9 33.6 37.5 42.1
VA 38.6 22.7 83.7 32.6 30.0 43.9
All 45.6 33.0 82.5 38.0 33.5 39.9
Binding
P=* .0000 .0000 .0000 .0087 .0001 .0001
*p value for the difference between all jurors in hybrid and in binding states
Do jurors understand when their punishment decision is binding on the
trial judge or merely a recommendation the judge is free to accept or reject?
The first column of figures in Table 1 shows the percent ofjurors in each state
who thought that "the judge must accept the jury's decision; it's final." Almost
none of the jurors in the hybrid states failed to understand that their sentencing
verdict was only advisory. No juror in Alabama and very few in Florida and
Indiana answered that the judge must accept the jury's decision. In these
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hybrid states as a group only one in twenty jurors (4.9%) believed their
punishment decision was final.
Striking is the fact that even in the bindings states no more than six out of
ten jurors recognize that the judge must accept their punishment decision.
Apparently, many of these jurors were reluctant to believe or to acknowledge
that the life or death decision was theirs alone to make. The jury's sentence is,
of course, subject to review and reversal in the appellate courts and recognition
of this may have prompted some jurors to answer that their decision was not
final. Yet, the question to jurors was explicitly limited to the trial judge as the
one who must accept or might override their verdict. In view of the
unambiguous character of the question, it appears that even in the binding
states many jurors simply preferred to assume that the trial judge would
exercise discretion in the final determination of the punishment. 1
26
Given this recognition of the judge's authority to step in and override the
jury's punishment decision in hybrid states, do jurors in these states take a
different view of the jury's responsibility for the defendant's punishment? At
least for binding statutes, the Caldwell doctrine holds that jurors must not see
the jury's responsibility as shared or passed on to judges who may review the
sentencing decision, and it barred prosecutors from arguing to this effect.'
27
Hence, jurors should believe that whether the defendant lives or dies is strictly
the jury's responsibility and no one else's. The second column of figures in
Table I shows the percentage of jurors in each state who subscribed to
precisely this statement about the jury's responsibility.
Caldwell's prescription is virtually a dead letter in the hybrid states. Only
about one in twenty jurors (6.9%) in these states believed that whether the
defendant lived or died was strictly the jury's responsibility. Jurors in the
binding states are also very reluctant to see the jury as strictly responsible for
the defendant's punishment. Two thirds of them see the jury's responsibility as
shared with or passed on to trial or appellate judges. 28 This widespread failure
126. The three CJP states that explicitly require trial judges to review jury imposed death
sentences and authorize them to impose a life sentence when it is called for by their review
(California, Kentucky, and Virginia) are significantly below the other strictly binding states in
the percent saying that the jury's punishment decision is final (column 1). The difference (33.9
versus 54.1) is significant atp = .000 (applying the procedure described supra note 119 to the
difference between these three states and the remaining eight strictly binding states, including
Louisiana). These three states do not, however, differ significantly from the remaining strictly
binding states with respect to any of the other factors examined in this statistical analysis, so we
will continue to include them in the "binding" category.
127. See discussion supra note 121 (discussing the Caldwell decision).
128. Jurors in the binding states responded in the following proportions: 33.0% "mostly
the jury's responsibility, but the judge or appeals courts take over responsibility whenever they
overrule or change the jury's decision;" 17.9% "partly the jury's responsibility and partly the
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of jurors in binding states to believe the jury alone is responsible for the
punishment decision is obviously at odds with the Caldwell doctrine. The even
more pervasive denial of responsibility among jurors in hybrid states is still
further at odds with the spirit of Caldwell, but here at least their denial is
consistent with the recognition that the jury's decision will be reviewed and
could be overturned by the trial judge.
Who or what then do jurors see as most responsible for the defendant's
punishment? When asked to rank the law, the judge, the jury, the individual
juror, and the defendant 29 from most to least responsible for the defendant's
punishment, jurors' responses in both hybrid and binding states reveal that they
think foremost responsibility lies beyond the actors involved in the decision
process. 30 Virtually half of the jurors said the defendant himself is the one
most responsible for his punishment. 31  Although it is true that he is
responsible for the crime, indeed this is precisely what the jury determined
when it convicted him, to say he is responsible for his own punishment is a
transparent "agentic shift."'132 It transfers responsibility to the person whose
fate must be decided as the one to blame for the onerous decision jurors must
make. Another third of the jurors 33 say the law that provides for the death
penalty is most responsible. Clearly, in this response jurors are fixing on
something antecedent or structural that serves as a necessary condition for the
punishment instead of the straightforward matter of who decides what the
punishment should be in the case at hand.
responsibility of the judge and appeals courts who review the jury's sentence in all cases;"
16.1% "mostly the responsibility of the judge and appeals courts; we make the first decision but
they make the final decision." The fact that the binding state jurors are more reluctant to see the
jury as strictly responsible than they were to acknowledge that the jury's decision was binding
on the trial judge (a difference of 12.6 percentage points between columns 1 and 2 for the
binding states), may be due to the fact that the alternative responses to this question make
reference to appellate as well as trial judges.
129. See supra note 124 (providing the exact wording of the question and response
options).
130. Jurors' rankings of these sources of responsibility are not tabulated here. For earlier
analyses of responses to this question, broken down by hybrid and binding states, see Bowers,
supra note 110, at t. 11.
131. The percentages are 46.3% in hybrid and 50.1% in binding states; not a statistically
significant difference.
132. This term was coined by Stanley Milgram to identify the assignment of responsibility
for inflicting pain on others, in this case the recipient of the pain. STANLEY MILGRAM,
OBEDIENCE TO AuTHoRITrrY: AN ExPauMENTAL VIEw 132-34 (1974).
133. The percentages are 34.2% in hybrid and 32.4% in binding states; not a statistically
significant difference.
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Having relegated themselves and the trial judge to the ranks of the less
responsible, it is here that jurors in hybrid states differ from those in binding
states in the relative responsibility they assigned to those participating in the
decision process; namely, the judge, the jury, and the individual juror. This is
reflected in the percent of jurors who say the jury is less responsible than the
judge, and in the percent who say the individual juror is less responsible than
the jury as a group (shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1).
The measure of responsibility of jury relative to judge confirms that the
hybrid statutes undermine jurors' sense of thejury's responsibility (column 3).
Jurors in each of the three hybrid states were less likely to place the jury ahead
of the judge in responsibility for the defendant's punishment than jurors in any
of the binding states. The corresponding measure of juror relative to jury
responsibility reveals that the hybrid statutes further undermine jurors' sense of
individual responsibility. While most jurors see themselves individually as less
responsible for the punishment than the jury collectively, this is especially true
ofjurors in hybrid as compared to binding states (column 4 of Table 1). In fact,
the jurors in all three hybrid states fall below the percent for jurors in the
binding states and even below the jurors in all but one of the specific binding
states.134 The hybrid statutes thus undermine not only jurors' belief in the
responsibility of the jury as a unit but also their sense of individual personal
responsibility for the punishment.
How jurors felt about the possibility that their punishment decision might
be overruled or changed is a further indication of their personal investment in,
or sense of responsibility for, the punishment decision. In this connection,
jurors could answer that it would make them feel bad "because it made their
sentencing decision less important" or "because the defendant might not get
[the punishment] s/he deserved." Quite obviously, these reactions might be
expected ofjurors who have assumed a personal sense of responsibility for the
punishment decision.
Jurors in the hybrid states were substantially less likely to feel bad for
either of these two reasons, as shown in the two far right columns of Table 1.
In states where the judge could override their decision, only one out of five
(20.8%) jurors indicated that they would feel bad because "it makes (their)
sentencing decision less important" and only one in four (25.2%) would feel
bad because "it means that (the defendant) might not get what s/he deserves,"
as compared, respectively, to one in three (33.5%) and four often (39.9%) in
the binding states. These differences between hybrid and binding states are
134. The only exception to this state-by-state consistency is that the binding state of
Missouri falls 3.5 percentage points below the hybrid state of Indiana.
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substantial and consistent. In response to each question, all three override state
percentages are below any of the binding state percentages.
The much reduced tendency of hybrid jurors to feel bad about the prospect
of having their sentencing decision overturned is consistent with their
diminished sense of the jury's responsibility relative to the trial judge and their
own diminished sense of personal responsibility relative to the jury. Such a
reduced sense of responsibility carries the further ominous implication that
jurors under hybrid statutes are apt to be less conscientious in making the
awesome moral judgment at the heart of capital sentencing. 35 Indeed, this
reduced sense of responsibility for the defendant's punishment may well be at
the root of the further problems under hybrid statutes of jurors failing to




Jurors' narrative accounts of their decision-making in the hybrid states
further indicates that they attempt to deny or escape responsibility for the
defendant's punishment. These accounts stress that the judge makes the final
sentencing decision and that this relieves the jurors of feeling responsible for
the defendant's punishment. The accounts presented here are drawn from
jurors' responses to a question that asked: "In your own words, can you tell me
what the jury did to reach its decision about the defendant's punishment? How
did the jury get started; what topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the
major disagreements and how were they resolved?"
In each of the override states, jurors commonly described themselves as
making only a recommendation or suggestion rather than a decision about the
defendant's punishment. In all three states, they use the same language or
135. The Caldwell Court stressed the need for jurors to appreciate their "truly awesome
responsibility" as indispensable for the reliability required in capital sentencing by the Eighth
Amendment. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985). The Court stated that:
Belief in the truth of the assumption that sentencers treat their power to determine
the appropriateness of death as an "awesome responsibility" has allowed this Court
to view sentencer discretion as consistent with and indeed as indispensable to the
Eighth Amendment's need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Id. at 329.
136. Excerpts are identified by state abbreviation and juror identification number. The L or
the D at the end indicates whether the case resulted in a life or death sentence, respectively. All
transcripts of the quoted juror interviews are on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review.
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phrases to characterize what they did: as "just a recommendation,"'137 as "only a
recommendation,"138 or as "a suggestion." 1
39
As one Indiana juror elaborated, "We were not really deciding, but were
making a recommendation. Whatever we decided, that didn't mean the judge
had to go with that recommendation."' 40 Anotherjuror from Indiana said, "We
knew that even if the jury decided the death penalty, the judge would not
necessarily follow. [The] judge could impose a prison term. [The] jury thought
of it more as a recommendation than a decision."'14' An Alabama juror
explained, "I knew we'd make a recommendation about the punishment not a
decision."' 42 Likewise, a Florida juror said, "We don't really make the final
decision. We make the recommendation. The judge makes the final
decision."' 143 Another Florida juror said, "We were not to decide-we would
give our opinion but the choice would be up to the judge. We would not be
sentencing him." 144 An Indiana juror offered an apt analogy, "It's almost like
the electoral college, you vote for this, but it doesn't really count.'
45
Placing the decision in the judge's hands relieved jurors of responsibility
for the punishment. Manyjurors saw this removal of responsibility as a relief.
As an Indiana juror noted, "We knew that even if the jury decided the death
penalty, the judge would not necessarily follow. Our decision would not tie the
judge down. This relieved the minds of us jurors, we were not killing
anyone."'146 Anotherjuror described the judge's authority to overrule the jury's
sentence as meaning it was "not the whole thing on our shoulders."'147 Another
noted that "it crossed my mind that it was comforting, that if we really did
screw up, that the judge could override our recommendation.' 148 Still another
observed, "It made it easier simply to say yes because it didn't put us [in the
position of being] directly responsible." 
49
137. AL1814L, FLO155L.
138. 1N0484D, FL0212D, FL0219D.
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An Alabama juror interpreted the possibility of override as meaning that
"technically we weren't responsible .... The burden didn't lie on us."
150
Another Alabamajuror was "relieved that my decision won't give her the death
penalty."'151 Still another expressed relief, saying, "[I] felt an out by what [the]
judge said by overriding it.' 152 A Florida juror noted likewise that "what we
had to remember was that it was a recommendation and not the final say, so,
that made our minds feel better."' 153 In a case where the juror's exact words
were not tape-recorded, the interviewer noted the juror as saying, "Guidelines
took juror's responsibility away-which he was glad about.' 54 Anotherjuror
felt that "[the judge] was taking some of the responsibility off our shoulders and
allowing us to give an opinion and yet carrying the full load herself of whether
it would indeed be the death penalty or not."'
155
Like the Alabama juror who "felt an out," a Florida juror felt "off the
hook." This juror said "the fact that you could make a recommendation, that
you didn't make a yes or no, that someone else would make the decision, I
think that let us feel off the hook." 156 Indeed, this juror found the sentencing
process to be "not as traumatic as deciding his guilt because we would take the
steps, make a recommendation, and the judge would make the final choice."'157
In the words of another Florida juror, the bottom line would seem to be, "I
didn't want this on my conscience."
1 58
3. Overview
Whether the judge can override a jury sentence of death clearly influences
jurors' views about their responsibility for the defendant's fate. Although the
Capital Jury Project has revealed that jurors fail to understand many aspects of
the capital sentencing process, nearly all the jurors in hybrid states realized that
the judge did not have to accept their decision and recognized that the sentence
was not strictly the jury's responsibility. Compared to jurors in binding states,
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served as responsible for the defendant's punishment. Jurors who could be
overridden also were less likely to feel bad about the idea that their decision
might be overruled. Knowing from the outset that their decision was merely a
recommendation evidently made them feel less vested in the decision.
At the same time that jurors' understandings of who is responsible for the
sentence in hybrid states may accurately reflect the law in those states, the
reduced sense of responsibility under hybrid statutes is troublesome in light of
Caldwel 59 and Ring.'60  Caldwell emphasized the danger of unreliable
sentences if they are the work of ajury that believes "that the responsibility for
any ultimate determination of death will rest with others."'16 1 There can be little
doubt in view of the contrast between jurors' responses in hybrid and binding
states in Table 1 that the possibility of judicial override significantly reduces
jurors' sense of personal responsibility for the sentence. Ring stressed the
defendant's right to have a jury rather than a judge determine the basis for a
death sentence. Ifjurors are less invested in, or conscientious about making the
punishment decision in hybrid states, Ring's promise will be hollow because
their decision-making will be subject to an increased danger of unreliability and
arbitrariness. On both counts, then, the override statutes appear to be
undermining the constitutional underpinnings of capital sentencing.
B. Understanding Sentencing Instructions
The research of the Capital Jury Project has revealed that many jurors fail
to understand aspects of the law that are supposed to guide their punishment
decision-making. 62 The analysis here indicates that such misunderstandings
are exacerbated under hybrid statutes. In hybrid, as opposed to binding states,
fewer jurors understood that they were free to consider mitigating and
aggravating factors beyond those enumerated in their statutes, and more jurors
simply said they did not know what aggravating and mitigating factors they
could consider. Ironically, although they were less likely to say they knew what
aggravating or mitigating factors they could consider, jurors in the hybrid states
were more likely than those in the bindings states to say they had no trouble
159. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
160. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
161. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333.
162. See generally William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing:
Law's Failure to Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (2003)
(discussing the process ofjury decision-making); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in
Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided? 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995) (discussing
jury instructions in a capital trial).
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understanding the judge's sentencing instruction and less likely to report having
sought clarification of the instructions from the trial judge. With respect to the
procedures and guidelines for making the punishment decision, then, jurors
under hybrid statutes were less informed, less conscious that they were ill
informed, and less motivated to become better informed.
1. Statistical Data
The findings on jurors' comprehension of sentencing guidelines in Table 2
are based on jurors' responses to several sets of questions. Parallel questions
asked jurors what factors they were allowed to consider in favor of a death
sentence and in favor of a life or a lesser sentence.163 Another question asked
jurors if they had any difficulty understanding the judge's sentencing
instructions.' 64  A further question asked whether during sentencing
deliberations the jurors asked the judge for clarification of the law or the jury
instructions. 165 Jurors' responses to these questions appear in Table 2.
163. The exact wording of these two questions was:
Among factors in favor of life or a lesser sentence, could the jury consider...
any mitigating factor that made the crime not as bad?
only a specific list of mitigating factors mentioned by the judge?
(DON'T KNOW)
Among factors in favor of a death sentence, could the jury consider...
any aggravating factor that made the crime worse?
only a specific list of aggravating factors mentioned by the judge?
(DON'T KNOW)
The percentage giving the first and third response options to the question about mitigating
factors appears in columns I and 2 of Table 2; the percentage giving these response options to
the question about aggravating factors appears in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.
164. The exact wording of the question was:
Did you have any difficulty understanding or following the judge's sentencing instructions to
the jury?
no
yes (IF SO,) explain
The percent giving the second response option appears in column 5 of Table 2.
165. The exact wording of the question was:
During your sentencing deliberations, did the jury stop to ask the judge for further explanation
of the law or clarification of the instructions to the jury?
yes
no
The percent giving the first response option appears in column 6 of Table 2.
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Table 2: Percent of Jurors Responding to Various Indicators of Understanding Sentencing
Instructions in Hybrid and Binding States
Percent of Jurors Indicating They Understood That:
mitigsing Evidece Agavating Evidem
AnyCan Don't AnyCan Be Dcm't Had Asked
Be Know Caisided Know Difficulty JudItD
Considered wit b
HYBRID STATES:
AL 45.3 39.6 ** 45.3 15.1 42.3
FL 50.4 35.0 ** 38.5 6.0 21.6
IN 47.5 27.3 40.0 29.0 15.8 31.6
All 48.3 33.1 40.0 36.3 11.4 29.5
Hybrid
BINDING STATES:
CA 75.8 14.1 53.3 29.6 20.1 57.3
GA 59.5 31.1 52.7 33.8 22.1 74.0
KY 54.1 24.8 46.3 29.6 20.0 54.7
MO 63.2 21.1 48.3 28.3 39.0
NC 61.3 13.8 ** 13.6 37.8 64.2
PA 40.5 18.9 ** 27.0 *** 54.3
SC 48.2 36.8 46.5 33.3 15.0 48.6
TN 58.7 10.9 45.5 11.0 *** 56.5
TX 60.4 31.3 57.1 24.5 *** 39.8
VA 46.7 22.2 40.9 27.3 16.3 53.7
All 57.8 22.7 49.2 27.1 21.1 53.7
Binding
p=* .0081 .0009 .0767 .0046 .0015 .0000
* p value for the differences between jurors in hybrid and in binding states.
** Because the law is different in these four states, the peentages do not represent those correctly
understanding the law. The percentages for jurors in hybrid and binding states and the significance of the
difference between the two groupings ofjurors were calculated omitting the data from these four states.
*** Because this question was asked offewerthan halfofthejurors in these four states, the perceitages are
not regarded as reliable for these states Again, the percentage for jurors in hybrid and binding states and
the significance ofthe difference between the jurors in the two groupings ofstates were calculated omitting
the data from the four states with substantial missing data for this comim.
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All states must allow jurors to consider any relevant mitigating evidence
according to Lockett v. Ohio.16 6 This unfettered freedom to consider any and
all mitigation is essential if jurors are to make the constitutionally required,
individualized determination of whether a defendant deserves the death
penalty. 67 Yet, the figures in the first two columns of Table 2 show that fewer
jurors in hybrid than in binding states believed that they were allowed to
consider any and all mitigating factors, and more conceded outright that they
did not know whether they were restricted to factors listed in the statute or free
to consider any and all factors in mitigation.
Jurors in hybrid states more often voiced the mistaken belief that they
were restricted to the consideration of mitigating factors set forth in their capital
statute. As seen in Table 2, column 1, the percentage correctly realizing that
they were allowed to consider any mitigating factors in the hybrid states is
statistically significant and nearly ten percentage points below this percentage
in the binding states (48.3% versus 57.8%). The percentage for each of the
three override states is below the percentage for all jurors in the binding states;
Florida falls below seven, Indiana below eight, and Alabama below nine of the
ten binding 168 states in the percentage correctly understanding that they could
consider any mitigation.
Beyond their greater misunderstanding of what factors they could consider
in mitigation, jurors in the hybrid states more often conceded outright that they
simply did not know whether they could consider any mitigating factors or only
those identified in the statute (Table 2, column 2). Each of the hybrid states is
above all jurors in the binding states in the percentage saying "don't know" to
166. Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
167. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (requiring jurors to make
an individual determination before sentencing defendant to death).
168. Pennsylvania is the only state with a lower percentage than Alabama and has the
lowest percentage of all the states for the portion of jurors understanding that any relevant
mitigating evidence can be considered. The unusual language in the Pennsylvania statute may
explain why the percentage is so much lower than in the other binding states. Section 9711 of
Title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes states that the jury should be instructed that
the verdict "must be a sentence of death" if they find at least one aggravating circumstances and
"no mitigating circumstance." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2004). Considering the
characteristics of most capital defendants and death eligible crimes, it is hard to imagine a
capital case where there is absolutely no mitigating evidence if one is truly allowed to consider
any relevant evidence that makes the defendant less blameworthy. Instructions that imply that a
finding of "no mitigation" is a likely conclusion may make it harder for jurors to comprehend
that they actually are allowed to consider any relevant evidence that they believe is mitigating.
See Wanda D. Foglia, Mandatory Language in Pennsylvania Capital Statute Exacerbates
Problems with Jury Decision-Making, Unpublished paper presented at Annual Meeting of
American Society of Criminology in Atlanta, Ga (2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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the question about what mitigation they could consider; Alabama jurors are
above the jurors in all binding states, and Florida jurors are above those in all
but one of the binding states. The hybrid states are significantly above the
binding states by 10.4 percentage points in not knowing what mitigation they
could consider.
Concerning aggravation, in all states jurors must find at least one statutory
aggravating factor in order for the defendant to become eligible for the death
penalty. After such "narrowing," in the words of Zant v. Stephens,"' jurors
may then consider any other nonstatutory factors in aggravation unless the state
capital statute or state case law explicitly restricts their consideration only to
aggravators specified in the statute. 70 Whether jurors could consider any
aggravators, or were restricted to statutory aggravating circumstances, is thus a
state specific option. 17 1 Four CJP states-Alabama, Florida, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania-restrict jurors to aggravating factors specified in the
statute172 while the other ten have no such restriction. The percentages saying
jurors could consider any aggravating evidence for Alabama, Florida, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania have been omitted from column 3 of Table 2 since
they do not represent a correct understanding of the law pertaining to the
consideration of aggravation in these states.
As with mitigation, fewer jurors in the hybrid state of Indiana correctly
believed that they were free to consider any factors in aggravation. The
percentage in Indiana is below the percentage for all jurors in the nine binding
states (in column 3). 173 Though consistent, this overall 9.2 percentage point
difference between jurors in the one hybrid and nine binding states (40.0%
169. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983) (discussing the narrowing function of
statutory aggravating circumstances).
170. See id. at 904 (permitting but not requiring states to confine considerations to
statutory aggravating factors). Four of the CJP states do require that jurors only consider
statutory aggravators either by statute, as in Florida, FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2002), North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (2000), and Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711
(2004), or by case law, as in Alabama, Ponder v. State, 688 So. 2d 280, 285 (Ala. Crim. App.
1996).
171. In all states, jurors must find at least one statutory aggravating factor for the defendant
to qualify for the death penalty. Since the question asked whether jurors were free to consider
any aggravating factors (including those enumerated in the statute) or restricted to factors
identified in the statute, the response options are not confounded by the requirement that at least
one statutory aggravator be found.
172. See supra note 170 (discussing the respective state standards).
173. This represents the eight states for which percentages are shown in column 3 and
Louisiana, which is not shown in the table as indicated in supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
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versus 49.2%) does not reach statistical significance using the p =.05 level.174
Thus, while the data suggest a tendency for hybrid jurors to think that they are
confined to the statutory aggravators like their tendency to believe they were
confined to statutory mitigators, this pattern is not strong enough to be regarded
as statistically reliable.
175
Again, the jurors in hybrid states more often simply conceded that they did
not know whether they could consider any factors in aggravation or only those
identified by the statute (Table 2, column 4). This difference of 9.2 points
(36.3% versus 27.1%) in the percentage saying they did not know is statistically
significant. Alabama and Florida jurors were more often in the dark about what
they could consider in aggravation than jurors in any of the other states.
Why do jurors in hybrid states more often misunderstand or simply not
know the rules supposed to govern their consideration of aggravation and
mitigation? Is it because they feel less responsible for the defendant's
punishment, and are, consequently, less concerned or conscientious about
making the punishment decision? Their responses to two questions-one about
whether they thought they understood the instructions and the other about
whether they asked for clarification of the instructions (shown in columns 5 and
6 of Table 2)--shed light on this question.
The first of these questions asked jurors whether they had any difficulty
176understanding or following the judge's sentencing instructions to the jury.'
Despite more often acknowledging that they did not know whether they could
consider any or only statutory aggravating and mitigating factors (columns 2
and 4) and less often being correct about what they could consider when they
thought they did know (columns 1 and 3), jurors in hybrid states were less
likely than others to say that they had difficulty understanding the judge's
sentencing instructions. The percentage for the jurors in the three override
states was virtually half that for the jurors in the binding states, a difference of
174. p =.0767.
175. Notably, the tendency for more jurors in hybrid than in binding states to be mistaken
about the aggravating factors they could consider carries over to the four states that limited
jurors to statutory aggravating factors. Though fewer than three often jurors overall in these
states understood that they were confined to statutory aggravators, this understanding was one
third to one half as common in the hybrid states of Alabama (11.3%) and Florida (17.9%) than
in the binding states of North Carolina (37.0%) and Pennsylvania (35.1%).
176. Jurors' responses to this question are altogether missing for Missouri and largely
incomplete for Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas because this question was dropped from a
revision of the interview instrument used late in the interviewing process. Because more than
half of the jurors in each of these states (100.0% in Missouri, 54.1% in Pennsylvania, 69.4% in
Tennessee, and 58.3% in Texas) were not asked this question, the percentages are not shown for
these states in Table 2, column 5. The available responses from these states are included,
however, in percentage for all jurors in binding states.
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9.7 percentage points (11.4% versus 21.1%). Florida jurors were below their
counterparts in all states, and jurors in Alabama and Indiana were below
those in all states except South Carolina (among the binding states with
available data).
The one fact about sentencing they did clearly understand was that the
judge, not the jury, would have the last word about the defendant's
punishment (Table 1, column 1), and this may well have rendered aspects
of the sentencing instructions having to do with aggravation and mitigation
of less concern to them.
The other relevant question here asked, "During your sentencing
deliberations, did the jury stop to ask the judge for further explanation of
the law or clarification of the instructions to the jury?" In hybrid states,
jurors were far less likely to say, "Yes." The right most column in Table 2
shows that the percentage asking for clarification of the instructions in each
of the three hybrid states were among the lowest in the column and
substantially less than the percentage for all jurors in the binding states.
The jurors in Florida and Indiana fell below those in all binding states, and
those in Alabama were below those in all states except Missouri and Texas.
The percentage indicating that the jury asked for further explanation of the
law or clarification of the instructions was 24.2 percentage points lower in
the hybrid than in the binding states (29.5% versus 53.7%). Hence, the
hybrid jurors were more often ignorant of or wrong about the rules
supposed to govern their decision-making, at least in part because they
typically presumed they understood when they did not and because they
usually made no effort to learn otherwise when they were wrong-both
signs that they were less serious or conscientious about making the
sentencing decision than jurors in other states.
2. Narrative Accounts
Jurors' memories of the judge's instructions for sentencing in the
hybrid states were distinctive in that they seldom mentioned aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Frequently the only thing they had to say,
presumably their clearest memory of the judge's sentencing instructions,
was that the judge, not the jury, would make the decision on punishment.
Jurors' accounts presented here are drawn from their responses to a
question that asked specifically about jury instructions. It read: "What do
you remember about the judge's instructions to the jury for deciding what
the punishment should be?"
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In response to this question an Indiana juror on a jury that
recommended the death penalty recounted: "[The judge] stressed a lot that
it was just a recommendation. He said, all you're going to do, he said, if
you say yes, he should get the death penalty, that's not actually, you know,
it doesn't mean we're actually going to give him the death penalty. It's
just, you're recommending to the judge, and they, that was, all this
recommendation stuff was, was all we ever heard, that's all we ever heard,
was you're just recommending. They wanted to make sure we didn't think
we were actually killing him.'
77
Responding to the same question, an Indiana life juror, said, "The
main thing I remember is that no matter what we recommended that he
could do whatever he wanted. Whether we suggested the death penalty or
not it was just that, a suggestion."'178 Another Indiana juror recounted,
"Well, [the judge] told us, that, to read those instructions again like it said
in there, and that, . . . just because we said something, didn't mean that that
was truly what his recommendation was gonna be. It was that, just solely
that, a recommendation. And then that was pretty much it.'
79
Alabama jurors expressed similar understandings when asked the same
question. One death juror recounted, "Our decision was a recommendation
to the court. Technically we weren't responsible. The judge could
overrule us .... The burden didn't lie on us.' 80 A life juror responded,
"Just a recommendation-judge gave the actual sentence."' 81 Anotherjuror
said, "[The] Judge made a point, he could over-ride (give the jurors an
out)."', 82 One juror remembered, "When the judge instructed them on
sentencing he told them that he would make the final decision, taking their
vote into consideration."1
8 3
Nor did Florida jurors' responses to this question about jury
instructions differ. One life juror said, "I remember [the judge] told us
whatever we voted would not be the actual sentence-it was just our
recommendation to him-he would have the final say in what the sentence
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then it was up to him."'185 A death juror remembered that the judge
"basically told us what our options were and that ours was a
recommendation-that he made the final say." 186 A juror on the same jury
had a similar recollection: "Basically that we would recommend a
sentence-that he would have leeway to decide and that [if] he wanted to
change it, he could."'
187
Jurors perceived that the judge was emphatic about his or her power to
trump their decision, and they remembered this even though they were
vague about other details of the instructions. They used terms such as
"stressed," "was very explicit," and "emphasized" to describe this aspect of
his instructions. One juror recalled, "The judge stressed that the jury's
recommendation was not binding on the judge."'188 Another said, "[The
judge] was very explicit-ours was only a recommendation."' 89 Yet
another said, "[The judge] emphasized that even though we recommended
something that we would not be making the final decision-that he would
be."' 190 And, even when jurors acknowledged that they had difficulty
recalling the specifics of the judge's sentencing instructions, they still
remembered the point about override. One said, "I don't remember much
about [the instructions] other than that the ultimate decision wasn't in our
hands, that ours would be a recommendation .... "'9' Or as another
recounted, "[I] don't really remember what the judge said but [I] do
remember him reading us aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
that our decision was only a recommendation."'
192
3. Overview
The greater misunderstanding of jury sentencing instructions among
jurors in hybrid states appears to be rooted in the assumption that such
standards do not matter much since the judge actually decides the
punishment. This is what jurors stress over and over again in their
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instructions. They clearly remember and eagerly seize upon the judge's
assurance that he or she would make the punishment decision. In this light
it is hardly surprising that they less often said they had difficulty
understanding the judge's sentencing instructions than did jurors in
bindings states. Since they understood that the judge would make the final
decision, that made his instructions to them seem less relevant. Nor is it
surprising that jurors in hybrid states were much less likely to ask the judge
during their sentencing deliberations for clarification of the law or the jury
instructions. A misunderstanding appears less consequential when the
judge has said he will make the decision.
Yet, understanding and following jury instructions is essential to
reliability in capital sentencing. It was fundamental to the Supreme Court's
acceptance of the modem death penalty in Gregg and companion cases and
is fundamental to its subsequent jurisprudence. These CJP data show that
failing to understand sentencing instructions is a problem especially
pronounced under hybrid statutes. The problem is most evident in the
greater number ofjurors in hybrid states who concede outright that they do
not know whether they can consider any aggravating or mitigating factors
or only those listed in their statutes, and the greater number who think they
are limited to statutory mitigating factors when making their punishment
decisions. The prospect ofjudicial overrides appears to make jurors more
ignorant of and mistaken about how to make the punishment decision and
less willing to exert effort towards making sure they understand the
guidance they are supposed to follow.
C. Making the Punishment Decision
Jury deliberations on punishment require individual jurors to reach a
group decision on whether the defendant should live or die. Conscientious
jurors might be expected to devote considerable time and effort to such a
portentous decision. They might be expected to request copies of the
testimony or transcript to review during their deliberations, to remain
undecided longer and perhaps require more votes before they reach a final
decision. Less conscientious jurors will be impatient with deliberations
and quick to decide. Comparing juror responses in hybrid and binding
states to questions about these issues reveals that jurors under hybrid
statutes make the sentencing decision more quickly, more often without
reviewing transcripts of the testimony, with fewer votes and with fewer
jurors undecided about punishment at the first vote. The possibility of a
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judicial override appears to reduce the effort jurors devote to making life or
death decisions in capital cases.
1. Statistical Data
The findings that reflect the time and effort jurors invested in making
the life or death decision presented in Table 3 draw upon their responses to
four sets of questions. One asked jurors how long it took them to reach
their punishment decision. 193 A second asked jurors how many votes were
required for them to reach the decision.1 94 A third asked how many jurors
were undecided at the first jury vote.' 95 And a final question asked jurors
whether during their punishment deliberations they asked the judge for a
review of the transcript of certain testimony. 196
193. The exact wording of the question was:
About how long, overall, did the jury deliberate on the defendant's punishment in order to reach
its final decision?
The question was open ended; interviewers were instructed to prompt for the numbers of days,
hours, and minutes insofar as respondents could answer with this degree of exactitude. Their
answers were recorded in the following format:
[ # of days; __# of hours; ____# of minutes].
The percentage giving an estimate of one hour or less appears in column 1 and the percentage
giving an estimate of more than three hours appears in column 2 of Table 3.
194. The exact wording of the question was:
As best you can remember, how many votes did the jury take on what sentence to impose?
# of votes
The percentage indicating that the jury made its sentencing decision with only one vote appears
in column 3 of Table 3.
195. The exact wording of the question was:
When the first jury vote was taken, roughly how many of the jurors...
# voted for a death sentence?
# voted for a life (OR ALTERNATIVE) sentence?
# were undecided?
The percentage indicating that no jurors were undecided in response to the third query appears
in column 4 of Table 3.
196. The exact wording of the question was:




The percentage giving the first response option appears in column 5 of Table 3.
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Table 3: Percent of Jurors Responding to Various Indicators of Hurried
Decision-Making in Hybrid and Binding States
Percent of Jurors Saying:
Sence Decided in:
One Hour Thre or Sentece No Jurr was Asked for
or Less More Decided in Undecided at Testimony
Hours One Vcte First Vote Review or
Transcnpt
HYBRID STATES:
AL 37.7 37.7 26.5 78.7 21.6
FL 38.3 16.5 43.0 84.1 19.8
IN 28.4 46.3 26.3 58.6 34.0
All 34.6 31.6 33.7 74.1 25.4
Hybrid I
BINDING STATES:
CA 6.7 86.7 15.3 63.9 48.3
GA 21.3 58.7 18.6 68.1 21.9
KY 15.7 52.8 20.4 58.9 34.3
MO 8.5 45.8 22.0 62.5 33.9
NC 15.0 63.8 25.9 72.8 38.0
PA 23.6 54.2 24.3 53.8 38.9
SC 16.1 42.0 14.3 58.7 37.3
TN 13.0 50.0 29.0 70.5 37.8
TX 14.9 51.8 25.0 45.8 43.4
VA 25.6 39.5 20.0 70.0 28.6
All 15.3 56.2 20.5 69.3 37.8
Binding _______ ___________ ___
Bi * .0000 .0000 .0004 .0167 .0030
* p value for the difference between all jurors in hybrid and in binding states.
Jurors in the hybrid states decided on punishment much more quickly than
others. They were more likely to decide in an hour or less and less likely to
take three or more hours to decide, as shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. In
fact, more than twice as many jurors in hybrid as in other states reported that
the decision was made in an hour or less (34.6% versus 15.3%). In each of the
hybrid states jurors more often reported that the decision was made this quickly
than did jurors in any of the binding states. By the same token, jurors in the
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hybrid states were less often involved in decisions that lasted three hours or
longer, the time it took more than half of the jurors under bindings statutes.
Those saying the decision took more than three hours is 24.6 percentage points
lower in the hybrid than in the binding states (31.6% versus 56.2%).
Additionally, the vote count required for reaching a death verdict seems to
be what accounts for the sizable hybrid-binding difference in deliberations
lasting longer than three hours. In Indiana, where jurors must be unanimous,
the percentage saying the decision took longer than three hours was below the
corresponding figures in only six of the ten bindings states. By contrast, in
Alabama and Florida where the vote need not be unanimous the percentage
taking longer than three hours are below those in all ten binding states.
Moreover, the percentage saying more than three hours in Florida where a
majority rules was well below that in Alabama where a death recommendation
requires ten votes. Hence, in those relatively uncommon instances under
hybrid statutes when it takes longer than an hour to reach a punishment
decision, whether it takes as long as three hours is a function of the number of
jurors needed for such a verdict. These data thus reveal that both the authority
ofjudges to override jury punishment decisions and the rule thatjuries need not
reach consensus to recommend the punishment figure in an apparent rush to
judgment under hybrid statutes.
Hybrid statutes thus have a double-barreled influence in hastening
punishment deliberations. They increase the likelihood that juries will make
the punishment decision in an hour or less, and when it takes longer than an
hour they shorten the time needed for such a decision by the degree of
consensus they require for such a verdict. Does this quick decision-making
under hybrid statutes compromise the capital defendant's right to an
"individualized" sentencing decision 197 based on a full consideration of
mitigation essential for a reasoned moral choice? 98 Jurors' responses to three
questions shed further light on this possibility.
The number of votes the jury takes to reach its punishment decision may
reflect the degree to which jurors challenge and contest the views of their peers.
It may reflect the kind of healthy disagreement that forces jurors to soberly
197. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (elaborating on the individual standard);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (discussing individual sentencing).
198. In Perny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), Justice O'Connor stressed that the
sentencing decision must be a reasoned moral response that entails the full consideration of the
defendant's background, character and crime. She states that "[riather than creating the risk of
an unguided emotional response, full consideration of evidence that mitigates against the death
penalty is essential if the jury is to give a 'reasoned moral response to the defendant's
background, character, and crime."' Id. (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
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review and rethink their assumptions and conclusions. Jurors were asked,
"How many votes did the jury take on what sentence to impose?" The
percentages in column 3 of Table 3 show that in hybrid states jurors are more
likely to decide the sentence on their first vote. The three override states as a
group are 13.2 percentage points above the average for the binding states
(33.7% versus 20.5%). Indiana and Alabama are not far above many of the
bindings states, but Florida shows the most substantial departure from the other
states. Perhaps Florida's majority wins decision rule that typically forecloses
protracted deliberations also makes one vote all it takes to reach a punishment
verdict in many cases. 99
Does deciding on punishment quickly, even in just one vote, under hybrid
statutes mean that jurors more often have their minds made up early in
punishment deliberations? Jurors who are initially undecided about the
defendant's punishment are probably open to opposing arguments and evidence
essential for making a reasoned moral choice. One question asked how many
jurors were undecided at the first vote on punishment. While most jurors
answered that nobody was undecided at the first vote, this response was more
common by 10.2 percentage points (74.1% versus 63.9%) in the hybrid than in
the binding states (column 4). The percentages for each of the hybrid states
reveal, however, that this difference is owing to the greater numbers who said
no juror was undecided in Alabama and Florida. The percentage for Indiana is
actually below that for all jurors in binding states. Jurors were clearly less
likely to voice uncertainty or indecision in these two states either because they
spent less effort wrestling with the pros and cons of the alternative punishments
or because the non-unanimous decision rules make jurors less reluctant to take
a stand or to express their position when the jurors first vote on the punishment.
Is it only the expression of disagreement or is it the conscientiousness with
which jurors approach their task as well that suffers under hybrid statutes? A
mark of scrupulous decision-making is close and careful review of the evidence
during jury deliberations. A good indication of this reliance on the evidence
may be reflected in a review of trial testimony with the aid of the trial
transcript. A question asked jurors whether during sentencing deliberations the
jury stopped to ask the judge for a review or transcript of certain testimony.
The figures in column 5 indicate that jurors were less likely to ask the trial
199. A further examination of the data shows that the percentage being able to decide in
two votes is greater in Alabama than in Indiana (28.6% versus 21.7%), and the average number
of votes required to decide the sentence was 3.7% in Alabama as compared to 4.0% in Indiana.
Thus, while requiring a consensus often instead of twelve seems not to increase the percentage
of sentences decided in one vote, it does appear to decrease the number of votes required to
resolve the sentencing question.
976
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judge for a transcript or a review of the testimony of witnesses in the hybrid
states. The difference in reviewing testimony between the two groups of states
was 12.4 percentage points (25.4% versus 37.8%), while all three hybrid states
were below the percentage for the binding states, again, it was the hybrid states
without an unanimity requirement where the difference was greatest. Jurors in
the hybrid states are clearly quicker to decide on punishment, and this appears
to be a rush to judgment that dispenses with the time consuming review and
consideration of detailed testimony and evidence.
2. Narrative Accounts
The accounts of many jurors in hybrid states indicate that they did not
devote much time, energy, or emotional commitment to the punishment
decision. Some jurors explained that since the judge could override their
decision, lengthy deliberations would be a waste of time. Forjurors' accounts
that pertain to the commitment of time and effort to the punishment decision,
we returned to the question that asked, "In your own words, can you tell me
what the jury did to reach its decision about the defendant's punishment? How
did the jury get started; what topics did it discuss, in what order; what were the
major disagreements and how were they resolved?"
In response to this question, Indiana jurors indicated that judge override
forced compromise and weakened holdouts. One Indiana juror explained,
"[W]e compromised, and unanimously agreed that he had intentionally killed
[one victim's name] and unanimously agreed that he had, that it had not been
proven, that he had killed, intentionally killed, the other one. '200 Anotherjuror
in this case reported, "It did not take long at all. ... Just a couple of hours and
really that was leisurely. When we went into the jury room it was a matter of
unwinding, we had a bit to eat. So really it didn't take that long. If we had
been all business it would have taken a half hour.,
20 1
The effect of prospective judge override on potential holdouts is illustrated
in the words of another Indiana juror: "There was one holdout. She just had a
thing about the death sentence. It wasn't this thing in particular. Just the death
sentence. (Interviewer's Comment: She soon came around.) I think [it was]
partly because the judge could overturn any thing we said. It was just a
recommendation, not a 'we're going to do it tomorrow' thing. It seemed to
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made quickly without giving much explanation: "On the punishment, we,
deliberated like, fifteen minutes, only had to take one vote."20 3 "We all agreed
to the death penalty right away, there was no argument. It was quick and
clear.
,2 04
In Alabama, jurors conveyed the impression that the jury was in a hurry, it
did not take very long, it was a real quick thing: "[We] were in a hurry to give
punishment and get out of there. 20 5 "Didn't take very long. Everyone agreed
on life. One or two thought if he was guilty that's what he deserved. We
didn't discuss much. 20 6 "It was a real quick thing 15-20 minutes. We wanted
to go out because it was too quick it was just real quick. Not a lot of
deliberations. ,,207
In a few instances jurors indicated that the punishment decision was
already made before deliberations; this naturally shortened deliberations. One
juror said, "Well as I said, when we went into the jury room it was a rather brief
thing. We had agreed that we were not going to give him death.... After a
very few minutes it was accepted by all the jurors., 208 In the words of another
juror, "She got the other jurors to agree in advance not to vote for capital
punishment. 20 9 "[We] took a poll first to see where jurors stood. Jurors had
pretty much made up their mind before they got into deliberations and never
changed. Discussed view[s] and left it at that.
210
In Alabama, which requires a ten to two vote to impose the death penalty,
jurors explained that deliberations were brought to an end by the prospect of
judge override, "[Male juror's name] was the last to change his vote to life
without parole. He did change because he knew the judge would have the final
say.... He knew in his own mind that the judge had the authority to overrule
[sic] or go with that decision., 21' In another Alabama case, jurors who wanted
the death penalty nonetheless went along with a lesser sentence in the hope that
the judge would override the jury's decision: "We knewjudge had final say-so.
So we went along with LWOP. No way to change the minds of those three.
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ahead with the death penalty."212 One potential holdout juror reported that he
was, "disturbed at [the quickness].... Everybody had already decided except
for me. They were all ready to vote. They took a vote. I was trying to
decide-went over everything. I cast the deciding vote for [the] death
penalty.
, 2 13
In Florida, a number of jurors were emphatic about how quickly the jury
reached its decision without even offering an explanation: "I firmly believe that
within 2 minutes of walking into the jury room everybody there knew exactly
the way he was going to vote. '214 "We talked but pretty much had our minds
made up. Took vote in 30 minutes., 215 "It was pretty quick-the jurors took a
vote and everyone voted for the death sentence. 2 16 "There seemed to be very
little discussion at all-they seemed to be eager to vote for death. 2 17 "The
punishment was very cut and dried. We just voted, there was no
disagreement. 
21 8
Some jurors felt that their fellow jurors did not take their duties seriously:
"I think that some of the jurors took it too lightly. 2 19 "In general, they did not
consider how serious the decision was many jurors treated it like a 'party' and
did not consider its importance.0
220
Florida jurors recounted how a simple majority vote ended deliberations:
A Florida death case juror said, "We went in this time the same way we went in
for the first phase let's sit down and talk for a minute and make sure we
understand the two penalty options that we have. We have death and life
imprisonment. The life in prison does not involve parole so this fellow will not
be out next week or two or three years down the road. So then we did a straw
vote and I believe it was 8-4 for death which was enough right there to
recommend death. 2 1 A life case juror said, "One person tried to get us to
speak one at a time-what punishment we should recommend. Wrote opinion
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votes taken., 222 Another life case juror said, "We didn't spend a great deal of
time on it. All we had to do was have a majority.
2 23
The need for only a majority in Florida influenced the decision process.
Pro death jurors disarmed opponents with the fact that the vote did not need to
be unanimous. "We discussed the fact that it did not have to be unanimous.
There were a couple who didn't feel strongly enough about capital punishment
[to] apply it to [the defendant]. One man kept saying that he couldn't take the
responsibility of putting someone to death.... So then we had to discuss that
our decision did not have to be unanimous and that what we do is make a
recommendation and the judge may or may not go with our decision." 224 In
another case, pro death jurors actively opposed going to the judge with a
question. "The jury was mostly women and they were very vicious and they all
wanted the death penalty right away. I wanted to go back to the judge to see if
he could give us the option of life without parole but they didn't want me to do
that so we voted and it ended up being death., 225 Another Florida death case
juror opined, "[If] it had to be a unanimous decision, it would never have been
reached. ,,226
3. Overview
Hybrid capital statutes evidently foster a rush to judgment in capital
sentencing, contrary to the kind of responsible, informed and reasoned moral
choice contemplated by Penry.227 This conclusion is grounded in the fact that a
significantly greater number of jurors in these states report deciding the
sentence in less than an hour, and significantly fewer report taking more than
three hours to reach a punishment verdict, in the fact that more jurors report
that the jury reached its punishment decision in one vote, that no jurors were
undecided about punishment at the first vote and that jurors did not stop their
deliberations to ask the judge for a transcript of certain testimony. This
constellation of differences comprise a pattern of rushing to judgment in hybrid
states, and the rush appears even greater when jurors may recommend
punishment without an unanimous vote. When the trial judge decides what the






227. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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likely to feel responsible for the punishment, less concerned with jury
instructions, and in a hurry to be done with their punishment deliberations.
These findings prove robust against a challenge of spuriousness. We have
tested the statistically significant differences between hybrid and binding states
shown in Tables 1-3 against the possibility that they could be due to systematic
differences in characteristics of the crimes, the defendants, or the jurors
between these two categories of states. We address this issue in Appendix A
where we show that none of these factors that do differ significantly between
hybrid and binding states account for any of the observed hybrid-binding
differences in Tables 1-3. The findings are thus shown not to be a spurious
product of other differences between the hybrid and binding states.
The analysis now shifts from jurors to judges under hybrid capital statutes.
V. The Politics of Judging Capital Cases Under Hybrid Statutes
In most states the judges who conduct capital trials do not make the life or
death sentencing decision. Prosecutors decide whether to bring a capital
charge,juries decide whether the punishment will be death, and trial judges are
bound by the jury's punishment decision. Appellate judges do review these
jury decisions, but they cannot impose death sentences, only invalidate them.
Under hybrid statutes the situation is different, trial judges have final
sentencing authority; they can impose death sentences; they can override ajury
vote for life. When their sentencing decisions accord with their constituents'
feelings about the right punishment, they will win public approval. In cases
where media coverage has stirred public ire and the jury that hears the evidence
votes for life, the trial judge's override to death may win public favor. Indeed
as election time approaches, a well-publicized life to death override could help
win re-election. The temptation to convert a jury's life verdict into a death
sentence may increase as ajudicial election nears, especially if such an election
is apt to be close.
In this section we first review evidence of how the decisions of appellate
judges with the authority to invalidate jury imposed death sentences provoke
political responses that influence their re-election prospects. Next we turn to
evidence of how the actions of trial judges with the power to override jury life
verdicts with death sentences is related to seeking public favor and elective
office in hybrid states. Then, returning to the CJP interviews with capital
jurors, we examine two cases in which judges imposed the death penalty
despite jury life verdicts for evidence of trial judges' sensibilities to the
conscience of the community under hybrid statutes.
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A. Appellate Judges and Death Penalty Politics
Appellate judges who become identified as likely to overturn death
sentences have been removed from office in a number of states.228  In
California, a 1986 campaign targeted Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird
for her record of reversing death sentences.229 The challengers used paid TV
spots designed to arouse resentment in the community to attack Bird.23° One
such commercial showed a mother gazing at a picture of her young daughter,
who was a murder victim and lamenting that, if not for Bird, her daughter
231would still be alive. Bird lost a 1986 recall election by a two-to-one margin.
Tarred with the same brush, Associate Justices Grodin and Reynoso were voted
out in the same election.232 Commenting on the effect of these removals,
former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus observed:
I'm afraid the era of retaining judges on the basis of their character, without
tallying up their votes, is a thing of the past. There's no way a judge is
going to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions,
especially if he or she has to make them near election time. That would be
like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.233
In Mississippi, Justice James Robertson was voted off the state supreme
court in 1992, after being attacked for a "morally repugnant" death penalty
decision.234 His opponent, who campaigned as a "law and order candidate,"
actually attacked Robertson for expressing the view that the Constitution did
not permit the death penalty for rape where there was no loss of life (despite the
U.S. Supreme Court's ruling twelve years earlier that the rape of an adult
woman was no longer a capital offense).235
228. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv.
760, 776-813 (1995) (providing an extensive inventory of instances illustrating the political
implications and ramifications of the death penalty-related decisions and actions of judges).
229. See Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (Apr. 1987)




233. Thomas M. Ross, Rights at the Ballot Box: The Effect of Judicial Elections on
Judges? Ability to Protect Criminal Defendants'Rights, 7 LAW & INEQ. 107, 118 (1988).
234. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 228, at 763 (discussing political implications of
death penalty decisions).
235. Id. (citing Court's Ruling Morally Repugnant, CLARION LEDGER, July 2, 1989). The
case was Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 403-06 (Miss. 1989) (Robertson, J.,
concurring) (expressing the view that there was "as much chance of the Supreme Court
sanctioning death as a penalty for any non-fatal rape as the proverbial snowball enjoys in the
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In Tennessee, Justice Penny White was voted off the state supreme court
after concurring in an opinion that reversed a death sentence.236 The Tennessee
Conservative Union sent out materials to the voting public including a brochure
that mentioned three cases in which Justice White "puts the rights of criminals
before the rights of victims."
237
In Texas, Judge Norman E. Lanford, who presided over the state district
court in Houston was defeated in the Republican primary by Caprice Cosper, a
prosecutor who specialized in death cases.238 She claimed that as a judge,
Lanford recommended that a death sentence be set aside due to prosecutorial
misconduct, and directed an acquittal in another murder case due to
constitutional violations.239 Cosper was elected after a campaign in which radio
advertisements on her behalf attacked her Democratic opponent for having once
opposed the death penalty.24°
In Florida, Supreme Court Justice Rosemary Barkett faced criticism in a
bitter and contentious U.S. Senate confirmation hearings on her nomination to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 241 Republicans attacked Barkett for her
alleged refusal to enforce death sentences and branded her a "liberal who
coddles criminals., 242 Unlike Bird, Barkett was able to withstand the scrutiny
directed at her death penalty record in the U.S. Senate.
Former North Carolina Supreme Court Justice James Exum has speculated
that political death may be the inevitable consequence of opposing capital
punishment.243 He described how North Carolina's High Court overturned a
nether regions"). Twelve years earlier, the Supreme Court had outlawed the death penalty for
the non-fatal rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
236. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions? 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 308, 310-13 (1997) (describing defeat of Penny White).
237. See id. at 314 (quoting Tennessee Republican Party, Campaign Brochure, Just Say
NO! (1996)). See also Fred B. Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the
Jury Override, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1017, 1029 (discussing Justice Stevens' Opening Assembly
Address, American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 3, 1996)).
238. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 228, at 763 (discussing Judge Lanford).
239. See id. (citing Network Affiliates Feature Bush Interview, HOUSTON POST, Mar. 10,
1992, at A13).
240. Id.
241. See Paul Anderson, Barkett Caught in Senate Cross-Fire Over Crime, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 1, 1994, at IA (describing Senate hearings Barkett endured in her attempt to secure federal
court of appeals judgeship).
242. Id.
243. Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure, 21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 270 (1994).
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death sentence because of an error related to a preemptory challenge. As a
result, the court was the target of an "unfair critique" in an op-ed article that
appeared in the Charlotte Observer concluding the court's decision was
"simply ridiculous., 245 Other criticisms followed in the media in the form of a
cartoon illustrating a loss of confidence in the court itself.246 Justice Exum
concluded that, "the more this type of thing occurs in our state judiciaries, the
less likely it is going to be that the state judges will be able to survive if they
sometimes overturn death sentences.,
247
Systematic research finds that this political vulnerability of appellate
judges takes a toll on their opinions and voting in capital cases. In a case study
of the Louisiana State Supreme Court, Melinda Hall found that a justice who
tended to support defendants' claims in criminal cases was less likely to do so
in capital than in non-capital cases and even less apt to do so in capital cases as
re-election time approached.248 In a personal interview, this justice explicitly
conceded that he withheld dissents in capital cases because he feared they
would attract adverse publicity and thus hurt his re-election chances.249
This pattern was confirmed in two broader studies. A sample of state
supreme court justices from Texas, North Carolina, Louisiana, and Kentucky
showed that dissents from decisions denying defendants' claims in capital cases
were reduced if justices (1) were elected from a local rather than a statewide
district, (2) had won their previous election by a narrow margin, (3) were
244. Id. at 272 (discussing the difficulty of survival for a state court judge overturning a
death sentence).
245. Id. at 272-73.
246. Id. at 273.
247. Id. Nor is the effect of public response limited to the recall of appellate judges. It
appears to have prompted statutory changes, as well. In 1991, Delaware switched from jury
sentencing to a jury override system following the imposition of life sentences on defendants by
a New Castle County jury in a much publicized capital murder case involving the execution
style murders of two armored car guards. See State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 848-49 (Del.
1992) (describing the "new" law). The bill was enacted under a suspension of legislative rules
on the day it was introduced with little debate in either house of the General Assembly. Id. at
849. Colorado abandoned jury sentencing in 1995 in favor of a three judge sentencing panel
who, presumably, would be less likely to be overruled following Governor Richard Lamm's
expressed regret at having appointed two state supreme court judges with whose rulings in a
capital case the governor disagreed. See Robin Lutz, Comment, Experimenting with Death: An
Examination of Colorado's Use of the Three Judge Panel in Capital Sentencing, 73 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 227, 237-38 (2002) (discussing how political pressure may affect a judge's sentencing
decision).
248. See Melinda G. Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual
Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1119-21 (1987) (applying concepts derived from neo-
institutionalism to coalition behavior in state supreme courts).
249. Id. at 1120 (describing judicial reasons for not dissenting).
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nearing a re-election contest, (4) had the experience of previously seeking re-
election, and/or (5) had prior representational service.250 In a further study of
supreme court justices in California, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Ohio for the
period 1980-1988, Hall and Brace extended the analysis of voting and
dissenting in capital cases among state supreme court justices to include factors
such as political party affiliation, years on the court, age, partisan judicial
elections, judicial rules favoring seniority, and competition for judicial office.
251
They found that the positions appellate judges take when reviewing capital
cases are influenced significantly by the anticipated reactions of their
constituents, independent of these other factors "in states with partisan.
ballots... political competition works to reduce the likelihood of dissents
against imposition of the death penalty.,
252
B. Trial Judges and Death Penalty Politics Under Hybrid Statutes
What about trial judges who have final authority to make the life or death
sentencing decision under hybrid statutes? They are closer than appellate
judges to the local communities in which these crimes occur and to the public
outraged by their gruesome facts and hideous details. They can see that the
repercussions of an unpopular decision in a capital case could be ruinous to
253their careers. Testimony to this recognition is the far more common
incidence of life to death than death to life overrides.254 As Justice Stevens
presciently observed some twenty years ago concerning Florida's hybrid
statute, "the fact that more persons identify with victims of crime than with
250. See Melinda G. Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,
54 J. POL. 427, 430-32 (1992) (suggesting that "state supreme court justices act strategically to
minimize electoral opposition").
251. See Melinda G. Hall & Paul Brace, Toward an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting
Behavior, 20 AM. POL. Q. 147, 147-68 (1992) (providing additional study of factors influencing
state supreme court decisions).
252. Id. at 163.
253. See Stephen B. Bright, Keynote Address: Capital Punishment and the Criminal
Justice System: Court of Vengeance or Courts of Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 279, 283 (1995)
(citing James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the Death Penalty Under State
Constitutions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1299, 1330 n.145 (1989)).
254. See Bumside, supra note 237, at 1042-44. Burnside reports that life to death
overrides outnumbered death to life overrides by ten to one in Alabama where judges run on
partisan ballots; three to one in Florida and two to one in Indiana, where judges face nonpartisan
retention elections; in Delaware there were no life to death overrides. Id. at 1043. The
unanimous vote for ajury sentencing verdict in Indiana may have curbed life to death overrides,
and the appointment rather than election of trial judges in Delaware may have liberated judges
from political pressures at work in other hybrid states.
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capital defendants inevitably encourages judges who must face election to
reject a recommendation of leniency. 2 55 Other observers have also surmised
that the prospect of public discontent with a show of leniency encourages
judges in hybrid states to override the life recommendations ofjuries, especially
so in the run up to judicial elections.256
Indeed, trial judges in hybrid states often trumpet their life to death
overrides in election campaigning. An Indiana judge's decision to override the
jury's life recommendation is an example. Three weeks before Judge Thomas
Newman Jr. sentenced Benny Saylor to die, an attorney announced that she
would run against Newman in the Democratic primary.257 This challenge was
the first opponent the judge had faced in years. 8 After winning the primary,
Newman campaigned on the slogan, "A Tough Judge for Tough Times" and
included in his television advertisement that he had imposed a death sentence in
the Saylor case.259
In Alabama, judicial elections are marked by professions of fealty to the
death penalty. 260 Judge Ferril McRae used advertisements showing his support
for capital punishment in a hotly contested primary election. One of his TV ads
states that he presided over more than 9,000 cases, including some of the most
heinous murder trials in Alabama's history, while at the same time the names of
notorious convicted murders whom McRae sentenced to death flash on the
255. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens elaborated on this point in Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,
518-19 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens asserted that jury decisions are more reliable
because juries are not motivated by political considerations:
I am convinced that our jury system provides reliable insulation against the
passions of the polity. Voting for a political candidate who vows to be "tough on
crime" differs vastly from voting at the conclusion of an actual trial to condemn a
specific individual to death. Jurors' responsibilities terminate when their case ends;
they answer only to their own consciences; they rarely have any concern about
possible reprisals after their work is done.
Id.
256. See Ross, supra note 233, at 118 (discussing how state judges are subject to
majoritarian pressures); see also Vivian Berger, Black Box Decisions on Life or Death-If
They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1067, 1085 n.107 (1991) (asserting that political pressure may affect elected
judges, "skewing their verdicts").
257. Steve Mills, In Death Cases Jurors Don't Always Prevail, CHi. TRm., Dec. 28, 2000,
at Al (discussing Judge Newman's decision to override the jury's verdict).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Ken Silverstein, The Judge as Lynch Mob: How Alabama Judges Use Judicial
Overrides to Disregard Juries and Impose Death Sentences, THE AM. PROSPECT, May 7,2001,
at 26.
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screen with captions such as "Singleton, Murdered Catholic Nun" and "State
Trooper Martin, Murdered and Burned Wife. 2 61 Notably, in the latter case the
jury had convicted Martin but voted to spare his life at the time the campaign
ad ran. Though McRae had not yet imposed the sentence, the ad virtually
announced that he planned to give Martin death,262 which he soon did.263
Alabama judges running for seats on the state supreme court also stress
their pro-death penalty actions and decisions as trial judges. For example,
Judge Claud Neilson boasted in a campaign that he'd "looked into the eyes of
murderers and sentenced them to death. 264 Incumbent candidate Kenneth
Ingram used a TV ad that opened with grainy videotape footage from inside a
convenience store where, twenty years earlier, a teenager had murdered the
owner.265 "Here," said the ad's narrator, "a 68-year-old woman, working alone,
was robbed, raped, stabbed 17 times, and murdered. Without blinking an eye,
Judge Kenneth Ingram sentenced the killer to die. 2 66 The victim's daughter
then appears on screen to give her personal endorsement.267 "It was my mother
who was killed, and Judge Ingram gave us justice.,
268
In Florida, the override of jury sentencing decisions is a foregone
conclusion for some trial judges. Jacksonville, Florida Judge Hudson Olliff has
overridden many jury life sentences with the death penalty.269 Life to death
overrides could also be anticipated from Florida Judge William Lamar Rose.
261. Id.
262. Id. Martin's attorney feared that the primary election would cause Judge McRae to
exploit Martin's case. In an interview he said of the judge, "He'd given plenty of continuances
to me in the past, but this time he refused to extend the May 1 trial date... I don't know if he
was politically motivated, but I do know that he had the opportunity to be on TV and in the
newspapers every day."
263. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 513 (1995) (noting that statistics compiled by
the Alabama Prison Project were lodged with the clerk of the United States Supreme Court).
The statistics of Nov. 29, 1994 show that that six of the overrides were by Judge Ferrill McRae,
five were by Judge Randall Thomas, and four were by Judge Braxtron L. Kittrell, Jr. See
Amended Motion for Recusal 7-8, Whisenhant v. State, No. CC 77-697 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mobile
County Feb. 7, 1991) (showing that although there are nine circuit court judges in Mobile,
Judge McRae had presided over 30% of the capital cases because he assigned a large number of
such cases to himself). Judge Randall Thomas overrode the jury and imposed death on Louise
Harris, the petitioner in Harris v. Alabama.





269. See, e.g., Barclary v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939,980-81 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(observing Judge Olliff's use of the same boilerplate language in three different cases in
overriding jury life sentences).
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Judge Rose protested the 1972 Furman decision that ruled the death penalty
unconstitutional by slinging a noose over a tree limb on the courthouse lawn.270
Even when a Florida judge grants a change of venue, the purpose may not be to
protect the right of the accused to a fair trial. A circuit court in Florida revealed
after the death sentence was entered against Raleigh Porter that the presiding
judge, Richard M. Stanley, had told the clerk that he was changing the venue to
another county that had "good, fair-minded people here who would listen and
consider the evidence and then convict the son-of-a-bitch. Then, Judge Stanley
said, he would send Porter to the chair. 271 The jury returned a life verdict and
Judge Stanley, wearing brass knuckles and a gun at the sentencing hearing,
sentenced Porter to death.272
Once again, statistical evidence bears out the influence of political
considerations, this time on the life to death override behavior of trial judges
under Alabama's hybrid statute. Fred Burnside examined the frequency of
Alabama override figures from 1986 through 1998 and found that their
occurrence was concentrated in the year before judicial elections. 273 That is,
there was a pronounced increase in overrides in the twelve months before the
elections as compared to the remaining five years of the judges' six year
terms.274 In fact, there were almost three times as many life to death overrides
in the year before the elections (15) than the yearly average for the other five
years between elections (5.8).275 Burnside concluded, "These results are
extremely significant statistically and indicate that something other than legal
doctrine is affecting Alabama's use of the override.,
276
Burnside further showed that while life to death overrides are twice as
frequent in Florida as in Alabama, they outnumbered death to life overrides by
ten to one in Alabama where judges run on partisan ballots compared to three
to one in Florida and two to one in Indiana where judges face nonpartisan
270. DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF DEATH
Row, 413-18 (1995) (describing Judge Rose's override in favor of the death sentence for Doug
McCray and the eventual reversal of that conviction after seventeen years in the Florida state
courts).
271. Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1487 (1 th Cir. 1995) (remanding for a hearing on
whether the petitioner could establish "cause" for failing to present previously his claim that he
was denied a fair and impartial judge).
272. Id. at 1488.
273. Burnside, supra note 237, at 1041 (presenting Alabama override statistics).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. (reporting that the probability that this pattern could have been generated by a
random process is only 0.0 15).
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retention elections.27 7 Behind these extremely disproportionate override ratios
for trial judges, there is a gross disparity in the response of appellate courts.
The overwhelming majority of life to death overrides in Florida have been
reversed by the state supreme court278 while virtually none were reversed in
Alabama.279 This seems to be more than a testimony that Florida judges' life to
death overrides are unreliably premised on erroneous judgments and findings.
It is hard to imagine that this drastic disparity actually reflects such a difference
in the quality ofjudging between the two states. But whatever the explanation,
it is surely symptomatic of yet another level of arbitrariness in the operation of
hybrid capital statutes, and hence in the treatment of capital defendants.
The relative frequency of life to death overrides and their concentration
prior to judicial elections suggests that trial judges in hybrid states are
shortchanging informed "community conscience" embodied in the jury which
has been exposed to the trial evidence in favor of ill-informed community
sentiments that may be stirred up by media coverage of the crime. The fact that
judges override life to death sentences far more often than death to life
sentences suggests that they are more sensitive to the public's call for harsh
punishment than to evidence and arguments of mitigation. The fact that they
perform such life to death overrides more often in the run up to judicial
elections suggests that the politics of gaining or retaining office heightens this
insensitivity to mitigation. 280 The conscience of the community is reflected not
277. Id. at 1043. Burnside also found that life to death overrides were much less common
and not disproportionate to death to life overrides in Indiana and Delaware. The requisite
unanimous vote for a jury sentencing verdict in Indiana may have curbed life to death overrides
in that state and the appointment rather than election of trial judges in Delaware may have
liberated judges to override more death than life sentences in that state. In contrast to Florida
and Alabama, the number of overrides are relatively few in Indiana and Delaware.
278. See John M. Richardson, Comment, Reforming the Jury Override: Protecting Capital
Defendants' Rights by Returning to the System's Original Purpose, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 455, 466 n.5 (2004) (noting that the Florida Supreme Court reversed eighty
percent of cases where the judge overrode the jury's life recommendation).
279. Burnside, supra note 237, at 1043 (citing Brief of Petitioner at 8, Harris v. Alabama,
513 U.S. 504 (1995) (No. 93-7659)). Burnside emphasizes that the appellate court's deference
to trial judges in life to death override cases in Alabama is more astonishing when one considers
that a third of all Alabama death sentences get reversed. Id. It also is noteworthy that about a
third of the defendants on death row are there because of life to death overrides and, as these
cases are not getting reversed, the reversal rate for the non-override cases is actually higher than
a third. Id. (citing Tracy L. Snell, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Capital Punishment 1997, BUREAU
JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 1998, at 15).
280. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 228, at 795.
The Bill of Rights guarantees an accused certain procedural safeguards, regardless
of whether those safeguards are supported by popular sentiment at the time of the
trial, in order to protect the accused from the passions of the moment. But nothing
protects an elected judge who enforces the Constitution from an angry constituency
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in the sentiments of the broader public that may have strong reactions to a
particular crime but in a representative jury chosen to be open-minded and
instructed to be unbiased, 28' a jury that becomes familiar with the facts of the
crime and the character of the defendant from the evidence and witnesses who
appear in the courtroom, and that must be receptive to evidence of mitigation in
order to make a sentencing decision that will be a "reasoned moral response.
282
We have seen in Part III that capital sentencing under hybrid statutes is
flawed by the unwillingness ofjurors to take responsibility for the defendant's
punishment, by their failure to understand sentencing instructions, and by their
283rush to judgment. From the anecdotal and statistical evidence reviewed here
in Part IV, hybrid sentencing appears further flawed by the political concerns of
trial judges in hybrid states, concerns that appear to diminish their sensitivity to
the community conscience when making the final punishment decision. If this
diagnosis of judicial vulnerability to political concerns is correct, it should be
reflected in the reasoning ofjudges who override jury life sentences, especially
in cases where the community conscience is at a premium. For a direct
indication of whether trial judges in hybrid states are failing to meet sentencing
that is concerned only about the end result of a ruling and may have little
understanding of what the law requires. Judges who must keep one eye on the next
election often cannot resist the temptation to wink at the Constitution.
As previously discussed, some judges have scheduled capital cases for before an
election or have refused to continue a case until after an election in order to gain
the publicity and other political benefits that accompany presiding over such a trial.
In these situations, the judge is under immense pressure to make rulings that favor
the prosecution because an unpopular decision will quickly turn the anticipated
benefits of association with the case into a major liability that could result in defeat
in the election.
Id. Justice Stevens has observed that:
Elected judges too often appear to listen [to] the many voters who generally favor
capital punishment but who have far less information about a particular trial than
the jurors who have sifted patiently through the details of the relevant and
admissible evidence. How else do we account for the disturbing propensity of
elected judges to impose the death sentence time after time notwithstanding ajury's
recommendation of life?
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 714 n.4 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. As Justice Stevens has observed, jury decisions reflect the values of the communities
in which the jurors live; therefore, they provide a better assessment of what the community
believes is the appropriate punishment for a particular crime. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 487 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is also worth noting
that capital juries are culled of people who are unwilling to impose the death penalty under any
circumstances. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,440 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, a
certain segment of the community already is excluded from capital juries.
282. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989).
283. See supra Part III (discussing the results of the Capital Jury Project).
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standards, we would want to know how both jurors and judges in the same life
to death override cases reached their punishment verdicts, and we would want
cases in which the flaws in jury decision-making under hybrid statutes are less
consequential. For this purpose, we have identified two cases in which we
have indications of how both judges and jurors reached their sentencing
decisions and in which the critical element of community conscience is at a
premium. The two cases we examine are instances in which the defendant was
a juvenile at the time of the crime. This is generally a strong mitigating
consideration among jurors that can be expected to override other faults injury
decision-making.2 84 We now return to the CJP interviews with capital jurors,
this time to their accounts of how they made their sentencing decisions in life to
death override cases where we have some indication of judges' reasoning as
well.
C. Jury and Judge Decision-Making in Life to Death Override Cases
Two cases in the CJP sample were trials in which the judge imposed a
death sentence despite ajury vote for life. These were both Alabama cases285 in
which the defendant was ajuvenile at the time of the crime.286 William Knotts
was seventeen, and Clayton Flowers was fifteen, when they committed their
crimes.287 Since a defendant's juvenile status, less than eighteen years of age at
the time of the crime, is usually a strongly mitigating consideration in the minds
of jurors,288 these two cases present a strategic test of the trial judge's
284. See generally William J. Bowers et al., Too Young for the Death Penalty: An
Empirical Examination of Community Conscience and the Juvenile Death Penalty from the
Perspective of Capital Jurors, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 609 (2004) (examining community consciences
as reflected in juror accounts of their decision-making in cases with juvenile defendants).
285. In the sampling of Florida cases the decision was made not to interview jurors in
override cases.
286. Both death sentences would now be unconstitutional in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,568 (2005) that outlawed the death penalty
for persons younger than eighteen years of age at the time of their crimes.
287. SeeKnottsv. State, 686 So. 2d431,441 n.l (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Flowersv. State,
586 So. 2d 978, 979 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). For an earlier analysis of these cases see Bowers,
supra note 284, at 636 n.150 (2004).
288. See Bowers, supra note 284, at 636 (discussing jury decision-making in juvenile
capital cases); Michael E. Antonio et al., Capital Jurors as the Litmus Test of Community
Conscience for the Juvenile Death Penalty, 87 JUDICATURE 6, 274-83 (2004) (discussing the
conscience of the community in juvenile capital cases); see also William J. Bowers, et al.,
Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors'Predispositions, Guilt Trial Experience,
and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476 tbl. 12 (1998) (comparing the
relative strength of defendant's juvenile status with other mitigating considerations in jurors'
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determination that the punishment should be death. For these two cases, we
first examine the strength of jurors' regard for the defendant's youthful age as
mitigation sufficient to offset a death sentence. We then examine the available
evidence of the judges' regard for such mitigation.
1. The William Knotts Case
The Knotts jury voted nine to three for a sentence of life without parole.
Interviews were conducted with four Knotts jurors. One juror recounted the
details of the crime in response to the following question:
Q:289 Now, I'd like you to tell me about the crime. In your own words,
give me the details I need to understand what happened and why.
J: ... [Knotts] and another boy went out walking one day, went AWOL
[from the juvenile detention institution where they were housed]. [They
were] standing on the bridge and a car came by and they thought the car
intentionally tried to hit them, and they jumped off the bridge, and they saw
the car went and turned off and went up the road. Evidently in [Knotts']
mind [this experience] just gnawed and gnawed at him and he went he
waited [a couple of weeks] till he was doing shop and went to the
bathroom, and crawled up in the crawl space. And then when everybody
left, he went back down, he wrote a note that I guess said he was going to
Dover which was a lie. He then wandered around the general vicinity of
[this incident] hiding in the woods and things like that, broke into a couple
houses. It looked like ostensibly to get food and clothing because evidently
it was cold out at that time of year. It wasn't real bright because he left,
you know, he'd just take off his stuff and put on the other people's stuff.
While he was doing this, evidently he found some guns. He found a gun at
one house and took it. He found a gun and some bullets at another house
and took it. Evidently, somewhere during this time, he spotted the same car
that [he thought tried to run him down]. He then found what house [the
driver lived in] and went into the house and waited for her. While he was
waiting for her, he committed some more burglaries, I think he got some
tennis shoes or something like that, which made it a capital offense (a
felony murder). He then hid in the laundry room. When he saw her come
up, she walked in the house with her young son, evidently, she walked into
the den, he pulled the gun and fired it at her probably two or three times...
he then evidently found the child. The prosecution's case was he tried to
shoot at the child, but the jury didn't really believe that. He had made a
statement, a taped, videotaped statement, that he thought about taking the
minds).
289. Quotations preceded by "Q" refer to questions from the instrument; those preceded by
"J" refer to juror responses; those preceded by "I" refer to follow-up inquiries by the interviewer.
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child with him. He then stole their car and drove to Birmingham.
Evidently, to see his girlfriend and they caught him in a parking lot outside
a business, at which, I think, a business outside of where she worked. He
had gone to see her, evidently, he had gone to her house and talked to her
briefly and then I think it was the next morning he was asleep in the car.
They took him to Montgomery, videotaped the confession, which he just
looked like a zombie. Just confessed to everything. He was just 'yes, sir'
and said everything he did.., he didn't try... the guy was sitting there
saying 'well of course,' he said, he shot at the lady, but didn't know if he
had killed her.
I: He didn't do anything to the kid, he just left the kid there?
J: Just left the kid there.
The defendant's dysfunctional family life and disruptive upbringing were
predominant in jurors' accounts. Indeed, this same juror began her account of
the crime with a description of the defendant's background. It served as a
preamble to her story of the crime.
J: William Knotts was, definitely had a very troubled childhood. Growing
up with an abusive father who was an alcoholic. He had run away from
home several times to try and get away from the situation. They found him
I think in a church or at city hall or a courtroom or something like that
crying when he was about 11, 12, or 13 and he asked not to be put back in
the home. So they placed him in a whole series of councilor [sic] care,
foster care type situations. I really think the H.R. blew it, they moved him
around an awful lot. Obviously that [sic] the child had a lot of problems.
He was probably, attention deficit disorder, had some emotional problems,
hyperactive, like that type of situation. He was being passed around.
Several things, finally he had urn, he was at one care facility and they had a
long list of what they called infractions, but most of them were things like
what I would call kids stuff, like talking to other kids after curfew, and
things like that. Well, anyway, he got into one situation uh, he threw some
chairs or something in the rec. room because he got mad so they transferred
him over to Mount Meigs.
This juror was haunted by the failure of authorities to provide much
needed care and treatment for young Knotts as indicated in her response to the
following question.
Q: Is there anything about this case that sticks in your mind, or that you
keep thinking about?
J: I really think that this is a case where society was culpable in this crime.
To me that really stuck in my mind. That the, that the authorities really
botched it, it should have never happened. One, the child should have
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gotten good counseling, should have been put in a permanent facility, so
there was some permanence in his life. You know what I mean, they were
trying to get him in King's Ranch. But he should have been placed in one
place and kept in one place and they worked on him in one place, rather
than when he did something, just some minor little cut up, that didn't go by
their rules, they transferred him. Uh, to me that was the thing that stuck in
my mind.... The authorities that are taking care of thirteen-year olds
should be more professional. And that stuck in my mind, that the witnesses
that they had for the people that were in charge with him while he was a
juvenile. I was not impressed with them.
290
Another juror was especially troubled by Knotts' dysfunctional family and
his parents' failure to care for him, to the point where they did not appear at the
trial for his life. When asked what stuck in her mind, this juror responded:
J: His mother and father were not, I know that children can do a lot of
wrong things, but what in the world could make his momma and daddy not
be there for him, you know I cannot imagine that. I have children and I
cannot imagine not being there for my children and I don't know what they
said that though the mother felt she did what the husband wanted her to do.
He controlled everything. They showed them in counseling sessions and
he'd try to be a good guy but it was very evident that she was... afraid of
him according to the testimony he abused her. The husband abused the
mother. I just can't imagine them not being there.29'
This juror reported further that the father also abused Knotts and his sister.
From the interviewer's written transcription of comments at the end of a
question about the respondent's thoughts or feelings about the defendant, the
juror noted that the jury "[h]eard a lot after his lawyer brought out evidence
about his home life. Abused by father. Sister sexually abused.
292
This juror's comments also reveal that the jurors watched the defendant
closely during the trial in an effort to understand his thinking and motivation.
She said that the discussion during guilt deliberations focused a great deal on
the defendant's reactions during the trial.293
J: He would, they would be talking, asking questions and its like we were
all trying to look at his face to see if there were any emotions. He would
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of the time he, we watched how he reacted when different people [testified]
we talked about that a great deal.2 4
When the questioning moved to the jury's punishment decision, the first
juror began her account with a telling contrast between William Knott's
appearance during the trial and his appearance a year and a half earlier on his
video-taped confession.
J: [He spent] maybe a year and a half, maybe two years in jail before the
trial. It was quite a period of time because he was, I really can't remember,
I just know that he was much older from when he had actually committed
the crime, cause he changed, his appearance. He'd become a man, he was a
boy before, when we saw then, when we saw the videotape of his
confession, he was like a little boy who had, messed up. But I did.., a
totally different human being than that was at the trial. It was really like,
they had put him on some kind of drug.
295
This juror then turned to the jury's discussions and its role in the
punishment decision.
J: We talked about humane. We talked about being pre-meditated, we
went back over a lot of the evidence and read more things about him, about
his behavior and his childhood. The records that they produced from the
other facility that he had been to played a large part, a tremendous part in
our verdict for life without parole.
2
Another juror recounted:
J: We looked at, spent a long time looking at a document that was not
entered that was introduced as evidence but was not really brought out
much in court. That was his medical history which was surprising. I don't
know, but it looked like it was more than four or five hundred pages. One
of the jurors was involved with special ed., so she picked up real quick
from looking at the medical record why she thought that, why she thought,
why he was doing what he was doing, when he was, you know, a lot
younger, and it really looked like that, he wasn't getting the kind of
treatment he was supposed to be getting.
2 9 7
This juror was then asked whether there was anything more about the jury
that would help explain why it reached its decision. She responded:
J: I really believe that his [b]ackground played a big part in it especially
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with children similar to him every day. They said a lot of things that
influenced us, so that I think the child's, the boy's background had a lot to
do with our decision.298
In spite of the jurors' belief that Knotts' age, immaturity, dysfunctional
family, and disruptive upbringing warranted a life sentence, the trial judge
nonetheless imposed the death penalty and the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals upheld the judge's sentence. 299 Drawing upon the judge's sentencing
report, the appellate court explained: "The trial court found the existence of
two aggravating circumstances and five mitigating circumstances. It...
weighed the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances,
and finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, sentenced the appellant to death."30 As mitigation, the judge
found factors the jurors recounted in their interviews:
(1) that the appellant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(2) that the appellant was 17 years and 11 months old at the time of the
commission of the crimes; (3) that the appellant comes from a
dysfunctional family with an alcoholic, abusive father and that this
background had a severe effect on him; (4) that he is impulsive and
immature for his age, and he never learned to adequately control his
emotions; and (5) that his entry into the state juvenile system began as a
runaway from a dysfunctional home and not because of delinquent acts.30'
The two aggravating circumstances that outweighed these five mitigating
circumstances in the mind of the trial judge were:
(1) that the capital [offense was] 30 2 committed while the defendant was
engaged in the commission of or attempted commission of a burglary and a
robbery, and (2) that the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel when compared to other capital offenses.30 3
The obvious question is why did these two aggravators outweigh the five
mitigators in the judge's mind? Was the robbery or burglary exceptionally
weighty as aggravation? The appeals court simply commented, "[W]e take
judicial notice that similar crimes are being punished capitally throughout this
298. AL1832L.
299. Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d 431, 483 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
300. Id. at 483.
301. Id. at 483 (citations to Alabama Code Section omitted).
302. The appeals court used the plural "offenses were" here. To avoid confusion, we have
substituted the singular reference to the crime which constituted a single killing, as did the court
in its description of the second aggravator immediately below.
303. Knotts, 686 So. 2d at 446 (citations to Alabama Code section omitted).
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state"3°4 and ignored the critical question of whether these other cases had
comparable mitigation. The appellate court paid more attention to the heinous,
atrocious, cruel aggravator, though here again it made no effort to assess its
weight relative to the mitigators in this case. Instead, it sought chiefly to
address the challenge that this aggravator was not in fact an aggravator at all in
this case.
305
Here is how the trial judge justified his determination that the crime was
heinous, atrocious, or cruel:
The State's evidence revealed the following:
A. Knotts constantly thought over a period of approximately two weeks and
planned this murder which was motivated by revenge, because he was mad
at Mrs. Rhodes for what he thought was her intentionally splashing water
on him. B. Knotts waited no less than two hours for Mrs. Rhodes to return
home so that he could carry out his plan. C. Knotts deliberately sat at Mrs.
Rhodes' [sic] home and took no opportunity to leave, both before and after
Mrs. Rhodes's arrival at her home... E. Mrs. Rhodes suffered extreme
physical pain, mental anguish and emotional trauma from the time she was
first shot... G. Mrs. Rhodes' [sic] baby, Darius, witnessed her murder. It
is reasonable to believe she experienced horror and terror prior to her
death, fearful for the safety of her son, Darius, who was hollering and
screaming for his mother. H. While Mrs. Rhodes lay helpless and
defenseless on the floor, Knotts consciously shot her a second time in the
304. Id. at 484 ("We take judicial notice that similar crimes are being punished capitally
throughout this state.").
305. In affirming this aggravator the court wrote, "[W]e adhere to the standard announced
in Exparte Kyzer, 399 So. 2d 330, 334 (Ala. 1981): the particular offense must be one of those
'conscienceless or pitiless homicides which are unnecessarily torturous to the victim."' Knotts,
686 So. 2d at 446. The Court went on to say:
The appellant argues, in substance, that he dispatched the victim quickly,
without unnecessary suffering, and that, therefore, the offenses were not
"conscienceless or pitiless" and "unnecessarily torturous to the victim" as required
by the Kyzer standard. We do not agree. There was sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's finding of the existence of the aggravating circumstance. After
being shot in her arm, the victim, who was apparently stunned, sat down on her
couch and faced her killer. It is reasonable to conclude from the evidence that she
was concerned about her child who had run into the room screaming at the sound of
the shot; that she made an effort to go to her child and was shot in the back as she
fell; and that the victim was aware of a third shot, which we conclude must have
been fired almost immediately after the appellant's shooting the victim twice
because of his admittedly hasty flight and that she could have believed had been
fired in the direction of her child. The medical testimony shows that she was
conscious between 30 seconds and a minute after she was shot in her back. One
can only imagine the terror that she experienced from the time she was first shot
until she lost consciousness.
Id. at 447-48.
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back leaving her to die. This was the fatal wound, and according to the
forensic pathologist, Mrs. Rhodes remained conscious for at least thirty
(30) to sixty (60) seconds after this shot.
3 6
The CJP interviews indicate that the jurors considered the question of the
heinous, atrocious and cruel character of the crime at length. They talked about
the fact that the defendant did not harm the child, and that the victims' death
was relatively quick, not purposely protracted. They compared this crime to
others they regarded as heinous and concluded this one was not. The second
juror quoted above, in responding to the question that asked jurors to describe
what the jury did to reach its punishment decision, recounted:
J: There was also some discussion about whether the [defendant] actually
shot at the child. The jury didn't believe ... the prosecution's contention
that he did. There was also a long discussion again about the physical
evidence, and about how quick death occurred and whether it was, you
know, and there was also some discussion about what was heinous,
atrocious, and cruel. And there was some discussion about, for us being,
you know, from the kind of part of society that would be on the jury, any
murder is heinous, atrocious and cruel. But it's not, to me, it, it's a
discretion, it's not like a Charlie Manson. You know, it wasn't like that
other case where the guy goes and kills the people and carves his initials in
their heads and chops their heads off.... So to us, even though there was a
murder, a senseless murder, it was not like he held the woman and
kidnapped her, and, you know for hours or something like that in the house,
or even if he just tied her up. It wasn't like that, she walked in the house
and boom he shot her kind of thing.
30 7
Clearly, the death sentence imposed by the trial judge in this case, contrary
to the jury's recommendation, was not owing to the judge's failure to recognize
the mitigation; indeed, in his sentencing memorandum, the trial judge affirmed
the essence of the mitigation as recounted by the jurors in their interviews with
us. The difference comes in the meaning or the weight the judge and the jury
assign to this mitigation relative to the aggravation. For the judge it carried
relatively little weight, for the jurors it was decisive. Their interviews make it
clear that his family experience, his treatment in juvenile facilities, his
immaturity, impulsivity and other psychological attributes as reflected in the
306. Id. at 447. According to the appellate court, two of the trial judge's findings "cannot
be reasonably supported by the evidence." The appellate court rejected the trial court's findings
that "D. Knotts hid and shot Mrs. Rhodes in her own home, knowing all the time she was
unaware of his presence and completely defenseless and helpless" and "F. Mrs. Rhodes was
unaware of and did not realize Knotts' intent to kill her when he pursued her from the den as she
struggled toward her son." Id. at 447 n. 12.
307. AL1833L.
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documentation presented to the jury, made the death penalty not just less
acceptable but unacceptable to them. The jurors appear to have searched their
consciences in making a "reasoned moral choice" based on an "individualized"
assessment of this defendant's age, character, background and upbringing, as
constitutionally mandated. 30 8 The judge may have sensed that the broader
public wanted to see a death sentence in Knotts' case and perhaps this made
him insensitive to the weight of the mitigation in the community conscience as
represented by the persons who served as jurors and were familiar with the
mitigation in this case. The politics of punishment may have made him unable
to give effect to the true conscience of the community in his decision-making
on Knotts' punishment.3 9
2. The Clayton Flowers Case
The Flowers jury voted eleven to one for a sentence of life without
parole.310 In the Flowers case, interviews were conducted with five jurors, but
the interviewer did not have a tape recorder, so we have only the interviewer's
usually brief synopses ofjurors' responses as hastily transcribed in the course
of the interview. While this restricts our ability to convey jurors' responses in
their own words, it does provide us with a picture of how the jurors thought
about the crime and the defendant, and how they reached their sentencing
decision.
The crime was committed by Clayton Flowers who was fifteen years old at
the time of the crime and an accomplice, William Caroway, who was eighteen.
They met up with a nineteen year old girl they knew, Karen Rolin, after her
work at a fast food outlet and went out with her in her car. Her beaten body
was found the next day in a nearby creek. Both Flowers and Caroway made
confessions to the police that implicated them in the killing. Flowers confessed
to acquiescing in the crime but denied being the one responsible for the killing.
He claimed to have had consensual sex with the victim but said that Caroway
forcibly sodomized the victim and killed her with a tire iron. Caroway claimed
that Flowers was chiefly responsible for the killing but did not testify at
Flowers' trial, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
308. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,288-305 (1976) (discussing the need
for individualized decision-making).
309. This resonates with Justice Stevens' observations in that jurors are a better barometer
of community conscience than judges. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 714 n.4 (1990)
(quoting Justice Stevens).
310. Flowers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978, 979 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
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incrimination, although he did claim chief responsibility for the killing
according to a cellmate whose testimony to this effect was barred by the trial
judge.31' Flowers was tried first and convicted of capital murder; Caroway was
tried three months later and convicted of noncapital murder. Both were tried
before the same judge who deferred sentencing until both trials were
completed.
Flowers' youthfulness was the critical mitigating consideration in jurors'
minds. When asked "what was the single most important factor in the jury's
decision about what the defendant's punishment should be," one juror simply
said, "He was too young for the death penalty. 31 2 In fact, Flowers' age raised
serious questions in jurors' minds about his guilt of capital murder. Several
believed that his youthfulness made him especially vulnerable to the peer
pressure of his older co-perpetrator. One said he was "coerced by the other
man involved in the crime. 3 13 Another said, "He did it to protect himself from
the co-defendant.
31 4
Two jurors explicitly linked Flowers' age to the jury's difficulties in
reaching a guilt decision. In response to a question that asked what were the
main areas or points on which jurors disagreed, a juror said, "[A] couple of
jurors did not want to find him guilty because they were hesitant to either give
him the death penalty or life without parole because of his age."315 Another
juror put it this way, "[S]ome of the jurors knew that he was guilty but were
trying to find a loophole to find him not guilty because of his age. 3 16 In
response to a question that asked, "Was there any discussion of whether
defendant was guilty of murder, but not of capital murder?" a juror said this
was the "main argument" during their protracted guilt deliberations.31 7 The jury
deliberated for nine hours over two days to reach its capital murder verdict.
31 8
The jurors reported not having been informed that they would have to
choose between a life or death sentence if they convicted Flowers of capital
murder. One juror said, "[T]he jury wasn't aware that they would have to make
311. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama confirmed the cellmate's readiness to







318. See Jury Finds Bay Minette Teen Guilty of Murder, E. SHoRE CoURER, Sept. 6, 1989,
at IA (describing the deliberation process).
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a decision on sentencing. 3 19 They learned this only after they rendered their
guilt decision. Several were disconcerted when they found out, as anotherjuror
put it, "I was in shock that we had to go back and decide on the sentence.
320
They reported, moreover, that no witnesses were called at the penalty stage of
the trial. Ajuror said, "[N]o evidence was given on punishment. The attorneys
both spoke to the jury and then the judge gave instructions."321 The jury then
deliberated, for only fifteen to twenty minutes, and voted eleven to one for a
life sentence. A juror described the deliberations saying, "[O]ne guy said we
should kill him. He was the only one. It was a real quick thing 15-20
minutes. 322
At the sentencing hearing for both defendants at the same time, Flowers's
attorney argued that a death sentence was unconstitutional for his client since
the Supreme Court had ruled in Thompson v. Oklahoma323 that the death
penalty was cruel and unusual as punishment for a defendant who was less than
sixteen years of age at the time of his crime.324 He also observed that the local
police and the county sheriff's department had improperly interrogated Flowers
by not having a parent or attorney present during the interrogations. These
authorities claimed that Flowers waived this right but neither the police nor
sheriff's departments could produce the waiver of this right they each said
Flowers had signed.325
Despite the jury's eleven to one life vote and the Supreme Court's
Thompson decision, the judge in the Flowers case found the death penalty
"morally compelling 326 and, when he imposed the death sentence, he called the
crime "especially heinous atrocious and cruel compared to other capital
offenses. 3 27 An analysis of the sentencing memoranda of trial judges in thirty
Alabama override cases, including Flowers, found that Flowers's judge was
among a small minority of four judges who found that aggravating outweighed





323. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
324. Id.
325. Flowers Sentenced to Death by Electrocution, THE ONLOOKER, Feb. 24, 1990, at IA.
326. See Kathryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death
Penalty Cases, 46 ALA. L. REv. 5, 31 (1994) (reviewing the sentencing memoranda of trial
judges in thirty Alabama override cases, including that of Flowers).
327. Flowers Sentenced to Death by Electrocution, supra note 325, at IA.
328. Russell, supra note 326, at 31.
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crime, he sentenced Flowers's co-perpetrator, William Caroway, who was
convicted of noncapital murder, to imprisonment for life.329
Was the judge's thinking dominated by the presumption that someone had
to pay the ultimate price for this crime? Was it not despite but because
Caroway got a life sentence that he sentenced Flowers to death? Was imposing
a death sentence when the jury wanted life more important to him than the fact
that his death sentence was apt to be overturned? His decision appears to be
consistent with a logic that dictates punishment as a response to public
sentiments apart from mitigation, proportionality, or constitutional
requirements.
Of course, the judge in the Flowers, as in the Knotts case, could not know
the critical mitigating role of the defendant's age in jurors' minds and their
punishment decision-making. They did know that the jurors favored a life
sentence by substantial nine to three and eleven to one margins. Yet, in both
cases the judges' override decisions declared that the juries were wrong. The
evidence from the interviews with jurors in these cases suggest, however, that it
was not the juries but the judges who were wrong, that the judges were
insensitive to community sentiments essential to a reasoned moral judgment
about punishment. In the Flowers case the jury was vindicated; the judge was
declared wrong because the sentence he imposed violated the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma that outlawed the death penalty for
defendants less than sixteen years of age at the time of their crime,330 the ruling
invoked by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in vacating Flowers's death
sentence.33 1
VI. Conclusion
Ring implies that trial judges cannot sentence to death without juries that
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, reach findings that qualify
the defendant for a death sentence, and make a life or death recommendation.332
329. See Flowers Sentenced to Death by Electrocution, supra note 325, at IA (noting the
punishments of Flowers and Caroway).
330. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (forbidding death penalty
sentencing for juveniles under 16 years of age).
331. Flowers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978, 991 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
332. As an alternative, Justice Scalia suggests in his Ring concurrence that judge only
sentencing (without the participation of a jury during the penalty stage of the trial) might be
constitutional under statutes that authorize juries to make findings of aggravation that qualify
the defendant for a death sentence during the guilt stage of the trial. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The question is whether to permit the trial judge to convert a jury's life verdict
into a death sentence, in light of what is now known about the impact of hybrid
sentencing on the decision-making of jurors and trial judges.
There is of course a basis for invalidating judge override in the logic of
Ring, apart from the empirical realities ofjury and judge sentencing behavior.
The Court could find that Apprendi's maxim that any finding necessary for an
enhanced punishment, whether a finding of fact or a judgment of sufficiency or
weight regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances, must be made by a
jury. The hybrid states have so far adopted a narrower interpretation of Ring
that preserves their override statutes and past death sentences. Indiana judges
initially overturned override death sentences on the basis of Ring but were
reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court. The Delaware, Alabama and Florida
Supreme Courts have rejected Ring based challenges to their hybrid statutes
and their override of imposed death sentences.
The Court could also rely upon the Eighth Amendment argument
advanced by Justice Breyer in Ring, and earlier by Justice Stevens in Spaziano
and Harris, that the Constitution requires the jury to be the sole sentencer. This
is so, they argue, because retribution, as the essential purpose of capital
punishment, must reflect the community conscience, and the jury is the
embodiment of that conscience. It is also so, they argue, because the
Constitution safeguards the defendant against having the trial judge, as an agent
of the state, act single-handedly (contrary to the jury's conscience and verdict)
to impose death as punishment.
In addition to these constitutional leads pregnant in the Ring majority
opinion and in Justice Breyer's concurrence, the Court's decision about hybrid
statutes should be informed by the empirical realities of judge override in
capital sentencing. One of those empirical realities, the one most prominently
revealed in this examination of the decision-making of capital jurors, is the
effect of override in undermining the conscientiousness and responsibility felt
by jurors in the exercise of their capital sentencing discretion. The other
empirical reality is the corruption of the judicial override itself, the conversion
of an intended protection against misguided jury decision-making into an
instrument of arbitrary death sentencing in its own right.
The statistical analysis shows that jurors in hybrid states are significantly
more likely than others to deny responsibility for the defendant's punishment,
to misunderstand sentencing instructions, and to rush to judgment,333 all signs
333. To be sure, the data show that denying responsibility for the defendant's punishment
and misunderstanding sentencing instructions are serious problems of the modem death penalty
in all states, yet they are substantially and significantly more egregious among capital jurors in
judge override than in jury binding states. For further documentation and discussion of these
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of the jury's lack of conscientiousness in its role as sentencer. These aspects of
capital sentencing have constitutional implications. In Caldwell, the Court
insisted that jurors whose sentencing decisions are final and binding on the trial
judge must not believe that responsibility for the defendant's punishment lies
elsewhere. Hybrid statutes explicitly hand final sentencing authority to the trial
judge. Virtually all jurors in hybrid states understand that their decision is not
final and this decisively undermines jurors' feelings of responsibility for the
defendant's punishment, contrary to the spirit of Caldwell. Gregg established
that sentencing discretion be guided by statutory provisions. Lockett made it
clear that a full consideration of relevant mitigating evidence was a crucial part
of this statutory guidance. Yet, jurors under hybrid statutes more often fail to
understand sentencing instructions, especially to recognize that they are not
limited in the consideration of mitigation. Symptomatic of diminished
conscientiousness, they more often fail to recognize that they do not understand
instructions and less often take steps to clarify them. Penry called for the
sentencing decision to be a reasoned moral response to the evidence of
aggravation and mitigation. The rush to judgment reflected in deciding on the
first vote, taking fewer votes, and making the decision more quickly are
symptomatic of the failure of jurors in the override states to make their
punishment decisions a "reasoned moral judgment" as Penry prescribes.
It might be argued that the failure of jurors in override states to be as
conscientious as those elsewhere in making the punishment decision is the very
reason judicial override is needed in these states. But this mistakes cause for
effect. It finds fault with the jurors when the hybrid statutes are to blame. It
assumes that jurors in override states are innately less able than elsewhere. In
fact, the statistical analysis in Appendix A examines many characteristics of
jurors including race, gender, and education, that might distinguish between
jurors in override as compared to binding states. It demonstrates that none of
these factors begin to account for the observed differences in jurors' sentencing
behavior under override and binding statutes. The inferior jury decision-
making in hybrid states is not the cause, but the effect, of giving the trial judge
the authority to invalidate the jury's sentencing decision and replace it with his
or her own verdict.
and other constitutional difficulties in capital sentencing as revealed in the CJP interviews, see
generally William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to
Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51 (2003) and William J.
Bowers et al., The Capital Sentencing Decision: Guided Discretion, Reasoned Moral
Judgment, or Legal Fiction, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 413-67
(James R. Acker et al., 2d ed. 2003).
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Ironically, judge override is not only a cause ofjury demoralization, but it
is, itself, a source of further arbitrariness in capital sentencing. Though the
power to override jury sentences may have been conceived as a protection
against arbitrary sentencing, it has turned out to be just the opposite. That is to
say, the override power has a pernicious effect on sentencing owing to the
influence of electoral politics. In states where trial judges play no role in
sentencing but appellate judges do review and rule upon death sentences, there
is evidence of appellate judges suffering at the ballot box for their opinions and
decisions in overturning death sentences. Research shows, in turn, that
appellate judges curb dissents in decisions upholding death sentences as their
judicial elections approach, especially if the election is apt to be closely
contested.
Under hybrid statutes this political pressure is concentrated on the local
trial judges who have final sentencing authority. The power to override the
jury's punishment decision subjects the trial judge in hybrid states to close
public scrutiny, second guessing, and the prospect of removal from office.
There are stark instances of trial judges in hybrid states who prominently
advance their records of life to death overrides for votes at election time. Here
too, statistical evidence shows that life to death overrides are significantly more
common in the run up to judicial elections and when judges run on partisan
ballots. The pattern appears to be one of pandering for political advantage at
the expense of defendants whose lives are at stake.334
The CJP interviews with jurors who served on two life to death override
cases with juvenile defendants show, moreover, that the judge's overrides ran
contrary to the community conscience as embodied in jurors' thinking and
decision-making. In these two cases, the judges appear to have acted without
an appreciation for the community conscience, as reflected in jurors' accounts
of their own thinking and decision-making about what the punishment should
be. While we have no direct evidence that either of these judges acted out of
concern about the broader public's response to their punishment decisions, the
need for safeguards against the arbitrary actions of trial judges as state officials,
claimed by Breyer and Stevens before him, is confirmed in jurors' accounts of
334. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. The failure to know what actual jurors
think and how they reach their punishment decisions is a detriment the Court has acknowledged
in other contexts such as jury selection, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 169-70 (1986), and
racial bias, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987), because it forces the Court to
rely upon assumptions that may in fact be legal fictions. The importance of assessing the
community conscience through interviews with actual jurors is illustrated with respect to the
juvenile death penalty in Bowers et al., supra note 284, and Antonio et al., supra note 288.
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the basis for their life sentences in these cases where the trial judge
nevertheless imposed the death penalty.
We have seen that under hybrid statutes, juries fall short of
constitutionally prescribed performance with respect to assuming
responsibility for the defendant's punishment, understanding and
recognizing when they do not understand sentencing instructions, and
taking time to deliberate thoroughly upon the convicted defendant's
punishment. Beyond this, under hybrid statutes trial judges submit to
political pressure to override jury life sentences, especially when their
election or re-election is expected to be close. Protection is needed
against this jury demoralization and against the force of public wrath
about heinous crimes on judicial behavior. The answer must not be to
ignore the empirical realities of capital sentencing under hybrid statutes,
but to remove the scourge of judicial override that is at the root of jury
demoralization and judicial corruption in capital sentencing. The law
should not subject judges to undue pressures to compromise judicial
neutrality, especially not when it also weakens jurors' conscientiousness
and sense of responsibility and even more so when the defendant's life is
at stake. The constitution requires greater care and reliability in capital
sentencing.
APPENDIXA: A Test for Spuriousness
The question we address here is whether the differences between
hybrid and binding states in Tables 1-3 are attributable to other
differences between these states. Are the observed differences in the
degree to which jurors are willing to take responsibility for the
defendant's punishment, the extent to which they understand instructions,
and the time and effort they will invest in reaching the sentencing
decision, simply the product of other factors that differ by state? It might
be, for example, that the differences discussed in Tables 1-3 are owing to
other factors such as the nature of the crimes, the characteristics of the
defendants or victims, the quality of the prosecution or defense, or
attributes of the persons who serve as jurors in the respective states. To
account for the observed differences, such factors would have to both
(1) differ between hybrid and binding states and (2) be related to the
respective indicators of taking responsibility, understanding instructions,
and making decisions.
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To identify factors that might meet this two-fold criteria, we
compared jurors in hybrid and binding states on a variety of factors
relating to the crime, the defendant, the victim, the prosecution and
defense, and the jurors themselves. These included some thirty-four
factors such as the following: the attention the case received in the
community; the number of perpetrator3 and victims; the age, sex, and
race of defendant and victim; the relationships of defendant to victim;
and social status and background characteristics of the jurors.
Hybrid/binding differences were not statistically significant for twenty-
four of these variables.335
Crime related variables:
o:. the amount of attention the case received in the community
o juror's view on the viciousness of the murder
:° juror's view on how depraved they thought the defendant
was
o the number of people killed
o whether defendant and victim were spouse or ex-spouse
o4o whether defendant and victim were family relations
: whether defendant and victim were neighbors
-: whether defendant and victim were friends
o:o whether defendant and victim were acquaintances
- whether defendant and victim were co-workers
°. whether defendant and victim were employer/employee
°:° whether defendant and victim were tenant/landlord
:- juror's feelings about guilt before guilt deliberations
Defendant and victim variables:
* gender of the defendant
4- age of the victim
Prosecution and defense variables:
: juror's view that prosecution performance was competent/
professional
o juror's assessment that prosecution did an "outstanding job"
* juror's view that defense performance was competent/
professional
o juror's assessment that defense did an "outstanding job"
4- juror's view of money or resources of prosecution relative to
defense
335. The same test for the significance of hybrid/binding differences in Tables 1-3 was
used here. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the statistical calculators).
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4'o juror's race (white or non-white)
Sentencing outcome:
:- whether the final sentence was a death or life sentence
Statistically significant differences between hybrid and bindings states
were found on ten variables: three reflecting the nature of the crime, four
pertaining to characteristics of the defendant or victim, and three concerning
the jurors. The crimes in hybrid states more often involved a single
perpetrator, less often involved strangers and more often involved lovers.
The defendants were younger; victims were more commonly female; and both
defendants and victims were more typically white in hybrid than in binding
states. Jurors were less educated, had lower incomes, and more often
attended religious services in the hybrid states.
To test whether any of the significant hybrid/binding differences in
Tables 1-3 are attributable to one or more of these ten significant differences
in crime, defendant, victim and juror variables between hybrid and bindings
states, we conducted Logistic Regression analyses with hybrid/binding status
and these ten significant correlates as simultaneous predictors.336
The statistical significance of hybrid/binding status as a predictor of the
seventeen indicators of taking responsibility, understanding instructions, and
making decisions, independent of these ten correlates as control variables,
appears in Table Al. The table shows both the p value indicating the
probability that the observed difference would occur by chance and the t test
scores on which the p values are based.337 The t test values permit
comparisons of the significance of the differences between hybrid and
binding states among these indicators of taking responsibility, understanding
instructions, and making decisions where the p values are less than .001 and
thus all appear as .000.
336. Logistic Regression is the preferred statistical approach for analysis of dichotomous
dependent variables. To minimize the effect of missing data in the analysis, we introduced a
dummy variable for the missing data on each independent variable. Essentially, this ensures that
all valid responses will be included in the analysis. R.J. LrTLE & D.B. RUBIN, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS WITH MISSING DATA (1987).
337. Since the sampling ofjurors was clustered by trial, we have employed the STATA 8.0
software package that allows us to calculate statistical significance with an adjustment for the
clustering ofjurors by trial. STATA STATISTICAL SoFrwARE: RELEASE 8.0 (2000).
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Table Al : Significance of Differences Owing to Hybrid Statutes on 17 Indicators of Taking
Responsibility, Understanding Instructions and Making Decision Controlling for 10
Correlates of Hybrid versus Bindings Status.
Significance of the Difference Between Jurors in Hybrid and Binding States
t test p value
Taking Responsibility
Judge must accept jury sentence 9.30 .000
Penalty strictly jury responsibility 7.15 .000
Jury more responsible than judge 7.17 .000
Juror more responsible than jury 2.83 .005
Jury's decision made unimportant 3.40 .000
Penalty may not be what's deserved 4.10 .000
Understanding Sentencing Instructions
Could consider any mitigating factor 2.11 .035
Don't know mitigators to consider -2.73 .007
Could consider any aggravating factor* 1.99 .048
Don't know aggravators to consider 2.26 .024
No trouble understanding instructions 2.53 .012
Did not ask to clarify instructions 5.62 .000
Making the Punishment Decision
Decided sentence in one hour or less -4.54 .000
More than three hours to reach sentence 4.50 .000
Decided on punishment in one vote -3.46 .001
No jurors undecided on first vote -2.79 .006
Asked for testimony or transcript 2.90 .004
* Statistics calculated excluding Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania 338
338. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (explaining the data in column 3 of Table 2).
1009
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2006)
The regression analysis demonstrates that the hybrid-binding differences
are quite independent of these possibly confounding factors. In the presence of
these controls, in fact, the sixteen significant differences between hybrid and
binding states in Tables 1-3 remain so with the controls (as shown in Table
Al). Indeed, controlling for these correlates of hybrid status alters the
statistical significance only slightly in most instances. The one factor that was
not significantly related to hybrid status at the .05 probability level in the
analysis of percentage differences, "Could consider any aggravating factor"
(Table 2, column 3)p = .0767, actually becomes significant at the .05 level in
the logistic regression analysis, p = .048.
We thus, find that the pernicious effects of hybrid statutes shown in Table
1-3 are confirmed in the presence of possibly confounding sources of
spuriousness. Hence, we can be confident that comparing CJP interviews with
capital jurors who decided cases in Alabama, Florida, and Indiana under hybrid
statutes with those from jurors in states where their decision was binding, truly
reveals that the punishment decisions of jurors in hybrid states were fraught
with less seriousness and conscientiousness owing to jurors' recognition that
their punishment decision was not final. Where their sentence determination
was merely a recommendation, they more often denied responsibility for the
defendant's punishment, they more often failed to understand jury instructions,
and they devoted less time and effort to deciding the sentence. The robustness
of the hybrid-binding differences demonstrated here confirms the evidently
deleterious effects ofjudicial override, and underscores the constitutional costs
of allowing the hybrid statutes to stand.
339. Recall that this comparison was based on a reduced sample of states because four of
the states did require jurors to restrict their considerations to statutory aggravating factors (see
supra Table 2 and accompanying text), which makes it less likely that differences will be
statistically significant.
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